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DISCOVERY IN AGENCY ADJUDICATIONt
EDWARD A. ToMLINSON*
INTRODUCTION
In 1962 the temporary Administrative Conference of the United
States' adopted Recommendation No. 30,2 approving in principle the
application of discovery rules to adjudicatory proceedings before
federal administrative agencies and recommending that each agency
adopt rules providing for discovery "to the extent and in the manner
appropriate to its proceedings." 3 The Report of the Conference's
Committee on Compliance and Enforcement Proceedings
accompanying the Recommendation' discussed the advantages of
broadened discovery in adjudicatory proceedings and urged agencies
to adopt as much of the discovery practice provided for the judiciary
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure5 as was appropriate. The
Report contended that the adoption of discovery rules would reduce
delays and promote fairness without prejudicing an agency's
execution of its statutory responsibilities.' The recommendation.
t This article is based on a report made by the author as a consultant to the Administrative
Conference of the United States. The report was made to the Conference in March, 1970, in
support of the Discovery Recommendations made by the Conference's Committee on
Compliance and Enforcement Proceedings. The views expressed in the report and in this article
are those of the author and have not been approved by the Committee or the Conference. The
author obtained much of the information on agency practice for this article through personal
interviews with agency staff and private practitioners. Those interviews took place during the
latter part of 1969, and the information obtained therefore reflects agency practice at that time.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Maryland Law School. A.B. 1961, Princeton
University; M.A. 1962, University of Washington; LL.B. 1965, Harvard University.
1. The temporary Administrative Conference was an experimental effort in improving the
procedures of administrative agencies. The Conference was asked to make recommendations
that would help to alleviate procedural shortcomings in the administrative process. Its success
led to The Administrative Conference Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 571-76 (1964), which established the
permanent Conference to "study the efficiency, adequacy, and fairness of the administrative
procedure used by administrative agencies . . . and make recommendations to administrative
agencies. . . in connection therewith." Id. § 574(2).
2. Recommendation No. 30, S. Doc. No. 24, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1963).
3. Id.
4. Report of the Committee on Compliance and Enforcement Proceedings in support of
Recommendation No. 30, id. at 115.
5. FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37. On March 30, 1970, the Supreme Court approved a major revision
of the civil procedure rules pertaining to discovery which went into effect July 1, 1970. 17 FED.
CODE ANN. 909-992 (1970). All references in this article are to the new rules unless otherwise
specified.
6. Discovery would not, of course, require disclosure of any material recognized as
privileged by law. Recommendation No. 30, supra. note 2, at 138.
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produced mixed responses from the agencies. The Federal Trade
Commission, the Federal Maritime Commission, and the Federal
Communications Commission have adopted discovery rules closely
modeled on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; 7 these are the only
major federal agencies whose rules authorize broad discovery in
adjudicatory proceedings. The remaining agencies have taken only
modest steps to implement Recommendation No. 30 or have done
nothing at all to change their procedures to permit more discovery.
In June, 1970, the Conference adopted Recommendation 21:
Discovery in Agency Adjudication.8 Where Recommendation No. 30
spoke in general terms and urged agencies to make appropriate
provisions for discovery, Recommendation 21 outlines as specifically
as possible the type of discovery which is appropriate in adjudicatory
proceedings. The recommendation covers six separate discovery tools
and designates minimum standards for their use in adjudicatory
proceedings. Since there is great diversity in adjudicatory proceedings
the Discovery Recommendation must recognize that the detailed
recommendations which it contains may not be suitable for certain
types of proceedings. Individual agencies may therefore
[t]ailor the recommended standards to meet the needs of particular types of
proceedings where special or less elaborate discovery procedures will
accomplish the same basic objectives or where the protective measures here
recommended will be inadequate to achieve the ends sought.'
Summary of Discovery Recommendations. Recommendations
1, 2, 4, 5, and 6 cover, respectively, Prehearing Conferences,
Depositions, Written Interrogatories to Parties, Requests for
Admissions, and Production of Documents and Tangible Things. 10
Each of these recommendations thus adapts to administrative
7. See 16 C.F.R. §§ 3.31-.37 (1970) (FTC); 46 C.F.R. §§ 502.201-211 (1970) (FMC); 47
C.F.R. §§ 1.311-.325 (1970) (FCC).
8. The complete text of the recommendation can be found in the Appendix accompanying
this article.
9. Introductory paragraph of Recommendation. The Conference amended the Committee's
original recommendation by adding the cited provision permitting departures from these
minimum standings when the protection measures are inadequate. Conference members feared
that in some proceedings witnesses could not otherwise be adequately protected.
10. Recommendation 21 contained nine separate recommendations dealing with various
aspects of discovery. References in this article to Recommendations 1-9 are thus meant to refer
to one of the steps suggested in Recommendation 21. Earlier drafts of the recommendations
prepared by the author contained a provision dealing with the discovery of exculpatory material.
This provision was not adopted by the Committee or the Conference. The text of this provision is
included in the Appendix.
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adjudications a particular discovery provision of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure." The Discovery Recommendations, however, do not
simply propose adoption of the federal discovery practice; they also
contain important modifications to meet the special needs of
administrative proceedings.' 2 These recommendations, therefore, rely
heavily on the successful experience of the judicial model but often
depart from that model because of the unique nature of the
administrative process.
The Federal Rules describe in considerable detail how the
mechanics of the various discovery tools operate.' 3 The Discovery
Reco.mmendations do not purport to treat these mechanical
provisions regulating the discovery process in any comprehensive
fashion. Provisions of this type will vary between agencies because
each agency must structure its discovery rules to meet the peculiar
nature of its own proceedings. While these recommendations allow
the individual agencies to fill in the details of discovery, they
contemplate that agencies will generally follow federal law on the
proper use and scope of these discovery tools unless the
recommendations propose modifications of that law. 4
Recommendation 3 on Witnesses differs from the other
recommendations in that it is derived primarily from federal criminal
practice rather than from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This
recommendation is a limited extension of the so-called Jencks rule"
requiring disclosure by the agency of prior statements of its witnesses;
the recommendation also provides for the prehearing production by
all parties of summaries of the testimony of their witnesses.
Recommendations 7, 8, and 9 contain general provisions essential to
11. FED. R. Civ. P. 16 (pre-trial conferences), 30-31 (depositions), 33 (interrogatories to
parties), 34 (production of documents and things), 36 (requests for admission).
12. For example, the administrative process must remain less expensive and speedier than
the judiciary. As a result, more emphasis is placed on exchanges of evidence than on the more
expensive deposition procedure. See notes 111-12 infra and accompanying text.
13. Rule 30 contains elaborate provisions on the procedures for the taking of a deposition on
oral examination; Rule 33 establishes a precise time schedule for serving and answering
interrogatories.
14. Agencies, for example, should look to the Federal Rules and judicial decisions
interpreting them for guidance in resolving such issues as the privileges available to litigants, the
sufficiency of answers to interrogatories, and the permissible use of depositions at the hearing
itself. It was not felt necessary to refer to these matters in the text of the recommendations
because the recommendations concentrate on the modifications which the agencies must make in
the judicial model.
15. The Jencks rule is derived from Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957), and 18
U.S.C. § 3500 (1964) (Jencks Act). See notes 79-105 infra and accompanying text.
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the effective functioning of the discovery process in adjudicatory
proceedings. Recommendation 7 strengthens the role of the presiding
officer by authorizing him to impose time limitations on discovery
and by restricting interlocutory appeals from his rulings on discovery
matters. Protective orders are provided for by Recommendation 8.
While generally adopting the approach of the Federal Rules, that
recommendation contains additional provisions dealing with the
protection of witnesses in the peculiar circumstances of administrative
adjudications. Recommendation 9 is a recognition of the necessity of
subpoenas for the enforcement of discovery requests and reaffirms the
principle that agencies which conduct adjudicatory proceedings
should have the power to issue subpoenas."6
Coverage of Discovery Recommendations. All nine
recommendations are limited to adjudicatory proceedings subject to
sections 5, 7, and 8 of the Administrative Procedure Act. 7 The type of
proceedings covered by the recommendations would therefore include
enforcement and disciplinary actions, licensing, and reparations
cases. The recommendations do not extend to informal adjudications
but only to those adjudications in which sections 5, 7, and 8 of the
APA require a formal hearing. The existing formal adjudicatory
procedure should readily adjust to the addition of discovery, while
16. The basic approach of these recommendations is to expand the availability of discovery
in adjudicatory proceedings as far as is compatible with the effective dispatch of agency
business. The American Bar Association's Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice
adopts a similar approach to discovery in criminal prosecutions. The Project's tentative report
outlines procedures for discovery in criminal cases which broadly provide for discovery in areas
in which it has not previously been available in either state or federal courts. ABA STANDARDS
RELATING TO DISCOVERY AND PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL (Approved Draft, 1970) [hereinafter
cited as ABA DISCOVERY STANDARDS]. While the standards proposed by the ABA often vary
from those of these Discovery Recommendations because of the differences between the criminal
and administrative processes, the two recommendations are strikingly similar in many
important respects and are based on similar premises. Compare the Preamble of
Recommendation 21 with the Project's proposed Standard 1.2. Both the ABA Standards and
the Discovery Recommendations emphasize the importance of pre-trial hearings and pre-trial
disclosure by the government of the names and prior statements of its witnesses. This latter
emphasis on "witness discovery" is consistent with the major recent advances in favor of witness
discovery in state criminal prosecutions. A growing number of states, most notably California
and New Jersey, permit the criminal defendant to discover not only the prosecutor's witness list
but also the prior statements of prosecution witnesses. The Discovery Recommendations also
assign a secondary role to depositions, while the ABA Standards do not provide for depositions
at all. These similarities stem from a widespread feeling that discovery may be the key to ending
many inequities and shortcomings currently existing in both the judicial and administrative
processes.
17. 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556 & 557 (Supp. V, 1970) [hereinafter cited as APA].
(Vol. 1971:89
A GENC Y DISCO VERY
formal discovery rules of this type may often deprive informal
adjudications of the advantages that flow from informality. While
agencies which conduct adjudicatory proceedings that are not covered
by sections 5, 7, and 8 of the APA are not within the letter of the
recommendations, such agencies should consider whether the spirit of
these recommendations extends to their proceedings. Often the basis
for the agency's exemption from these sections of the APA is
technical or unrelated to the preservation of the informal nature of the
proceedings. The need for adequate discovery may be just as great in
these proceedings as in proceedings formally within sections 5, 7, and
8. Recommendation No. 3018 acknowledged this fact by
recommending discovery in all adjudicatory proceedings.
Recommendation 21 does not depart from that principle but suggests
discovery rules that are more appropriate for formal adjudicatory
proceedings.
Rule-making proceedings are also excluded from the coverage of
the recommendations. These recommendations assume at least
limited agency experience with discovery; however, formal discovery
rules have apparently never been tested in administrative rule making.
In addition, rule-making proceedings, even those subject to sections 7
and 8 of the APA, involve different considerations which require
different procedures for discovery. Rule making frequently involves
large numbers of parties and a wide range of issues, including basic
issues of national policy. These features make impracticable the
wholesale application of these Discovery Recommendations to rule
making.
Implementation of the Discovery Recommendations. The
implementation of these recommendations normally should not
require an agency to seek enabling legislation from Congress. 9
Normally, the congressional delegation to the agency of general rule-
making power or of power to conduct its own proceedings in the
piblic interest should be sufficient authorization for the agency to
adopt procedural rules on discovery. In FCC v. Schreiber,20 the
Supreme Court upheld a Federal Communication Commission rule
on disclosure of information on the ground that Congress had left
18. Recommendation No. 30, supra note 2, at 37.
19. The exception to this is Recommendation 9 dealing with the power to issue subpoenas.
Those few remaining agencies which do not possess the subpoena power must obtain it from
Congress. Recommendation 9 on subpoenas recognizes this problem. See notes 172-75 infra and
accompanying text.
20. 381 U.S. 279 (1965).
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largely to the agency's judgment the determination of the manner of
conducting its proceedings. This delegation of authority was found in
section 4(j) of the Communications Act of 1934,21 empowering the
FCC to "conduct its proceedings in such manner as will best conduce
to the proper dispatch of business and to the ends of justice." The
Court interpreted this section as a grant of power to resolve
"subordinate questions of procedure. ' 2 2 Most agencies have
comparable grants of authority and should be able to enact
procedural discovery rules on their own initiative.23
A potential obstacle to this exercise of agency initiative is the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' ruling in FMC v. Anglo-Canadian
Shipping Co.,2 that Congress did not authorize the Federal Maritime
Commission to adopt a discovery rule for the production of
documents when it gave the Commission general rule-making power.
That decision has been sharply criticized2 and has not inspired any
progeny. The opinions in the case, particularly the concurring opinion
of Judge Pope,26 reflected a negative attitude toward the desirability of
discovery in administrative proceedings which influenced the judges in
their determination that the FMC had exceeded its statutory
authority. In dictum, the majority opinion acknowledged that
Congress had delegated discovery powers to at least three other
agencies. Following this decision the FMC obtained from Congress
legislation specifically authorizing it to adopt discovery rules roughly
similar to those in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 28 Anglo-
Canadian Shipping has not affected the operation of the FTC's
discovery rules, which do not have explicit congressional sanction, nor
did it deter the FCC from adopting liberal discovery rules without
specific Congressional approval .2 The decision's impact has therefore
been slight; further, its authority has been severely undermined by
Schreiber.
21. 47 U.S.C. § 154(j) (1964).
22. 381 U.S. at 289.
23. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77s (1964) (SEC); Federal Trade
Commission Act, id. § 46 (FTC); Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1354 (1964)
(FAA).
24. 335 F.2d 255 (9th Cir. 1964).
25. Galland, A Note on Maritime Discovery, 19 AD. L. REv. 119 (1966).
26. 335 F.2d at 261.
27. Id. n.9. The three agencies mentioned were the Interstate Commerce Commission, the
Civil Aeronautics Board, and the Federal Power Commission.
28. Shipping Act, 46 U.S.C. § 826 (Supp. V, 1970).
29. See note 7 supra.
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DISCOVERY RECOMMENDATION I -PREHEARING CONFERENCES
Prehearing conferences have become commonplace in agency
adjudication, and most agencies have recognized them as effective
devices for encouraging the settlement of cases and for shortening the
time necessary for the hearing. Settlement talk quite naturally follows
from bringing the parties together at the conference to exchange
information and to discuss the case. When settlement is not possible,
the hearing may still be shortened if the presiding officer and the
parties work together to simplify the issues and to obtain stipulations
of facts and of the authenticity of documents. Recommendation I is
not directly concerned with these functions of the prehearing
conference but concentrates on the value of the conference as a means
of providing the parties with discovery.
Present agency rules authorizing prehearing conferences30 are
generally modeled on rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
That rule makes the pre-trial conference optional with the district
court or presiding judge. Agency rules must also leave the scheduling
and structure of conferences largely to the discretion of the presiding
officer because of the great variety of cases handled by a given agency.
Complex cases may require a series of prehearing conferences, some
of them quite informal and off the record. On the other hand, many
cases do not justify the trouble and expense of bringing the parties
together at the prehearing stage. 31 Practical considerations may also
make a prehearing conference inappropriate in some instances. While
Recommendation 1 therefore leaves the holding of prehearing
conferences to the discretion of the presiding officer in all cases, it
does provide some general guidelines on the types of cases where
prehearing conferences are desirable. Under these guidelines, the
presiding officer should normally hold at least one prehearing
conference in proceedings where the issues are complex or where it
appears likely that the hearing will last a considerable period of time.
The Prehearing Conference as a Discovery Device. The prehearing
conference becomes a discovery device when the presiding officer at
the conference requires the parties to exchange their evidentiary
exhibits and witness lists prior to the hearing. Such arrangements can
30. See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 3.21 (1970) (FTC); 17 C.F.R. § 201.8 (1970) (SEC); 46 C.F.R.
§ 502.94 (1970) (FMC).
31. For example, many proceedings brought by the Coast Guard (Department of
Transportation) to revoke or suspend a seaman's license involve such a simple issue as whether
the seaman had narcotics in his possession. 46 U.S.C. §§ 2 39(a), 239(b) (1964).
Vol. 1971:89]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
properly be characterized as discovery because each party to the
proceeding becomes more aware of his opponent's case and can thus
better prepare for the hearing without fear of surprise. This
development is one of the more striking recent advances in
administrative procedure, and for once places the agencies ahead of
the courts in allowing discovery. The use of the prehearing conference
as a discovery device is commonplace at a number of agencies, even
where there is no specific rule providing that the conference be used
for discovery.
For example, the FTC's rule provides that the trial examiner at
the conference should consider directing the parties to exchange their
witness lists and physical evidence.32 Such exchanges are particularly
advantageous in complex merger cases where statistical reports play
an important role. This may be the first opportunity for a respondent
to learn the basis of the case against him, for complaints in these cases
are often framed in very general terms. The SEC has a similar rule
allowing the presiding officer to order exchanges of evidence at the
prehearing conference,3 3 a power widely used in disciplinary
proceedings against broker-dealers.3 4 The FMC's rule3 has been
particularly useful in investigations of practices of conferences of
carriers. The FCC's rule36 is phrased slightly differently, but the effect
is the same. While the rule does not mention exchanges between the
parties, hearing examiners have required parties to exchange, and thus
"freeze," their entire cases and to produce documents at the
conference stage.37 The Department of Labor's rule on prehearing
conferences in contract debarment cases under the Walsh-Healy Act "
authorizes the consideration at the prehearing conference of "the
propriety of mutual exchange among parties of prepared testimony or
exhibits. ' 3 In practice, this has meant that a contractor has been
32. 16 C.F.R. § 3.2 1(a)(6) (1970).
33. 17 C.F.R. § 201.8(d) (1970).
34. The Division of Trading and Markets is also willing to exchange witness lists except in
cases where it is convinced that it must keep the identity of its witnesses secret in order to protect
them.
35. 46 C.F.R. § 502.94 (a)(2) (1970).
36. 47 C.F.R. § 1.248 (1969).
37. Hearing examiners in the Department of Agriculture have also required parties in
disciplinary and reparation proceedings to exchange exhibits at the prehearing conference
although the applicable rules on prehearing conferences make no mention to this procedure. 7
C.F.R. §§ 47.14,47.36 (1970); 9 C.F.R. §§ 202.15 & 202.47 (1970).
38. 41 U.S.C. §§ 3545 (1964). The Act generally provides that the Secretary of Labor shall
have the power to insure that private employers working on government contracts shall pay theil
employees the area wage rate for the type of work being done.
39. 41 C.F.R. § 50-203.7 (1970).
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charged in general terms that he has underpaid his employees and then
is furnished particulars at the prehearing conference. Normally this is
done by supplying the contractor with the individual forms filled out
by the Wages and Hours Inspector for each underpaid employee;
these forms are then admitted into evidence at the hearing as part of
the Department's case against the contractor. 0 The most extensive
use of the prehearing conference as a discovery device occurs at the
CAB. Rule 23 of the CAB's Rules of Practice states in part that the
purpose of the prehearing conference is
"to define and simplify the issues and the scope of the proceeding, to secure
statements of the positions of the parties with respect thereto . . . [and] to
schedule the exchange of exhibits before the date set for hearing. .... . ,
In addition, the rule authorizes the examiner to compel a party by
subpoena to produce documents requested by another party at the
conference and to direct a party to prepare and submit further
exhibits. The operation of this rule alone is sufficient to insure
adequate discovery before the CAB.4"
Effect of Discovery Recommendation 1. Recommendation I
builds on the experience of those agencies which have recognized the
effectiveness of the prehearing conference as a discovery device. The
recommendation should have the dual effect of spurring other
agencies to adopt comparable procedures and of strengthening those
procedures at agencies which already use them.
Some agencies have experienced difficulty with prehearing
procedure when one or more parties to the proceeding refuse to
cooperate in the exchange of exhibits and information. Often
respondents feel that discovery is a one-way street and that they need
not disclose their case to the agency prior to the hearing. The solution
to this problem is to upgrade the role of the presiding officer. Under
Recommendation 1, he has the power, which he does not possess
under the existing rules of many agencies, both to call a prehearing
c6nference and to there direct that the parties exchange their
evidentiary exhibits and witness lists prior to the hearing. The
40. The Department's Rules of Practice, 29 C.F.R. § 6.7 (1970), for enforcement
proceedings under the new Service Contract Act, 41 U.S.C. §§ 351-57 (Supp. V, 1970), do not
mention any exchange of exhibits at the prehearing conference, but the examiners, who also hear
Walsh-Healy Act cases, have followed the same practice in the growing number of wage and
hours cases arising under the Service Contract Act.
41. 14 C.F.R. § 302.23 (1970).
42. See Maurer, Use of Discovery Procedures Before the CAB. 18 AD. L. Rav. 157 (1966).
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recommendation thus contemplates that the presiding officer will
assume the role of "governor of the law suit" and not simply be an
"umpire."43
While Judge Murrah coined these phrases with federal district
judges in mind, they are equally applicable to presiding officers in
administrative adjudications. The effective conduct of an agency
hearing is dependent on the presiding officer's diligence and on his
ability to control the proceeding.4 The examiner should not be forced
to leave the exchange of exhibits and witness lists for the parties to
work out themselves but should be able to take affirmative action to
make sure they do so. Sound judgment and considerable skill on his
part will be necessary to. insure the smooth and expeditious exchange
of cases between the parties. In complex cases, for example, an
examiner may need to hold a series of prehearing conferences where
the parties first make very tentative exchanges and statements of the
issues and subsequently add to their exchanges and finalize their cases.
If a party is in doubt on whether he plans to use a particular exhibit at
the hearing, the examiner should order him to exchange it with the
other parties since all parties are free at the hearing stage not to rely
on an exchanged exhibit. In the meantime, the other parties have
received the benefit of discovery. Recommendation 1 leaves the
scheduling of the exchange of evidentiary exhibits and witness lists to
the discretion of the presiding officer. Detailed procedures have not
been specified in the recommendation because it is important that the
presiding officer retain flexibility in scheduling the exchange. 5 The
one limitation in Recommendation 1 on the presiding officer's
discretion to schedule the exchange is that the exchange should be
43. Judge Alfred P. Murrah, Seminar of Procedures Prior to Trial, Ninth Circuit Judicial
Conference, 20 F.R.D. 485, 491 (1957).
44. Nicholson, Discovery is Not a Game, 21 AD. L. REv. 441, 446 (1969). The FTC has
repeatedly stressed that at the prehearing conference the examiner should not leave the
identification of the issues to the parties but should take "affirmative action" himself to clarify
and simplify the issues. See Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 63 F.T.C. 2196 (1963).
45. In the great majority of cases the exchange should not take place until after the initial
prhearing conference because it is not realistic to expect the parties to disclose their cases at an
earlier stage. Furthermore, in enforcement and disciplinary proceedings the agency should
normally produce its exhibits and witness list first because it is not fair to expect the respondent
to commit himself on his own case before he knows the agency's case against him. The presiding
officer may nevertheless find it appropriate in a particular proceeding or class of proceedings
where the issues are straightforward to require a simultaneous exchange or an exchange at the
close of the first-and only-prehearing conference. The simultaneous exchange of evidentiary
exhibits is customary in CAB route proceedings. See note 41, supra, and accompanying text.
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completed "prior to the hearing." Deferral of discovery until the
hearing itself generally disrupts and prolongs the hearing."
Recommendation 1 specifically permits a party to amend at any
time, by deletion or supplementation, his evidentiary exhibits and
witness lists, providing he has good cause to do so. A party may
uncover additional exhibits or witnesses prior to the hearing whose
existence or relevance were understandably not known to him at the
time of the exchange. Respondent's counsel, for example, may not
realize the need for additional exhibits or witnesses until after the
agency presents its case at the hearing. Agency counsel also cannot be
expected to know fully what rebuttal evidence is necessary until he has
heard the respondent's case at the hearing. For these reasons
amendments to evideniiary exhibits and witness lists should be
allowed for good cause at any time. Good cause is required because
the parties are expected to prepare their cases as fully as possible at
the prehearing stage and to commit themselves on the issues and on
their factual contentions at that time. It is implicit in the concept of
good cause that a party must amend his exhibits and witness lists as
soon as he has reason to do so. If a party learns of the existence of a
new witness or document prior to the hearing, he should amend his list
at that time rather than await the commencement of the hearing. A
party who has good cause must act promptly and not seek to surprise
the other parties by introducing the new matter for the first time at the
hearing.
The "evidentiary exhibits" which the parties must exchange at the
prehearing stage under this recommendation include documents and
other matters of which a party wants the presiding officer to take
official notice. This approach conforms with section 7(e) of the APA4 7
which grants a party the opportunity to contest a presiding officer's
46. There may be particular types of proceedings where an agency determines that the
respondent's disclosure of his witness lists and exhibits may properly be deferred until after the
agdncy presents its affirmative case. This deferred disclosure should be reserved for exceptional
cases, but it may in some instances serve to expedite matters by making it easier for the
respondent to comply with the order to exchange his evidence since he has a more exact
knowledge of which evidence he will rely on. Recommendation I does not preclude an agency
from authorizing its presiding officers to adopt such a special procedure in proceedings where it
is appropriate and where it accomplishes the basic discovery objectives of the recommendation.
These objectives are satisfied where the agency affords the respondent full discovery prior to the
hearing and where the agency's broad investigatory powers and the nature of the issues in the
case combine to make it unnecessary for the agency to know the identity of the respondent's
witnesses and exhibits before it presents its own affirmative case.
47. 5 U.S.C. § 556(e) (1964).
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official notice of a material fact. For that opportunity to be a
meaningful one, it must be offered to the party at the earliest possible
stage of the proceeding.4" A party should therefore know at the time of
discovery whether his opponent's case depends on official notice so
that at the hearing he will be able to challenge the use of that doctrine.
Witness Lists. The exchange of witness lists at the prehearing stage
of the proceeding raises special problems. Such an exchange furthers
the objectives of discovery by contributing to the fund of information
on which each party builds his case. Direct benefits from the exchange
include the avoidance of surprise witnesses at the hearing and
unnecessary trial preparation to meet the testimony of witnesses who
will not be called. There is a danger, however, that other parties will
attempt to intimidate a prospective witness or to influence his
testimony. This danger is particularly apparent in an .enforcement
proceeding in which the agency plans to call witnesses who are
employees of the respondent or who are otherwise dependent upon
him. Because of this danger, many agencies are wary of prehearing
disclosure of witness lists.49
The dangers posed to prospective witnesses by the disclosure of
witness lists should not be exaggerated. To date, the limited
experience with this type of discovery in criminal and enforcement
proceedings should encourage agencies to provide for the prehearing
exchange of witness lists. A surprising number of states -
approximately 22 in number-already require by statute or rule that
the accused in a criminal prosecution be notified prior to trial of the
witnesses to be called against himA0 The experience in these states has
been that the fear that the defendant would tamper with the witnesses
if he knew their names prior to trial was justified in only a minority of
cases and should be dealt with by protective orders in particular cases,
rather than serve as a barrier to discovery in all cases. 51 Similarly, the
Department of Labor, which enforces the Fair Labor Standards Act5'
48. See 2 K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE T 15.10 (1958).
49. Among agencies with adjudicatory responsibilities, only the FTC routinely discloses its
witness list prior to the hearing. The General Counsel's Office of the NLRB is willing at the
prehearing stage of an unfair labor practice case to make available to the respondent any
documents it plans to introduce into evidence but uniformly refuses to disclose the names of its
witnesses. While the SEC's Division of Trading and Markets often does disclose its witness list
prior to the hearing in disciplinary proceedings, the SEC has ruled that the respondent is not
entitled to the list as a matter of right. Keystone State Investment Securities, Inc., Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 8662, at 12 (Aug. 6, 1969). At least one court has agreed. Arm-
strong, Jones, & Co. v. SEC, 421 F.2d 359 (6th Cir. 1970).
50. ABA DISCOVERY STANDARDS 56-57.
51. Id. at 2-3.
52. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1964).
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through civil actions in the federal district courts, complies with local
court rules on the exchange of witness lists. The Department's
position is that it will not disclose the names of its witnesses as part of
the initial discovery process but will disclose their names at a
prehearing conference or at some other date reasonably close to the
trial. -'
The disclosure of the witnesses' names may in some instances
actually protect them in the same way that the disclosure of the name
of the charging party in an NLRB unfair labor practice case protects
that party. Since the National Labor Relations Act makes it an unfair
labor-practice for an employer or a union to discharge or otherwise
discriminate against an employee because he has filed charges under
the Act," the respondent employer or union knows that his treatment
of the charging party will be closely scrutinized to insure that there is
no discrimination against him for filing the charge. The respondent's
awareness of this scrutiny deters him from seeking reprisals against
the charging party. The disclosure of the charging party's name thus
works on balance to protect him from reprisals. Likewise, the Board
should be able to protect its witness and prospective witnesses. The
statute also makes it an unfair labor practice to discharge or
otherwise discriminate against an employee because he has "given
testimony" in an NLRB proceeding.55 While there has not yet been
any occasion to test this point, the designation of an employee on a
witness list should constitute "giving testimony" by the employee.
Courts have already ruled that giving an affidavit in the course of a
Board proceeding is equivalent to giving testimony.6 In light of the
policies involved,5 7 it should not be difficult to extend this definition of
"giving testimony" to designation on a witness list.
53. Wirtz v. Continental Finance & Loan Co., 326 F.2d 561 (5th Cir. 1964); Wirtz v.
Hooper-Holmes Bureau, Inc., 327 F.2d 937 (5th Cir. 1964). It should be noted that the
Department of Labor in these cases deals with employee witnesses subject to the same pressures
as employee witnesses in NLRB proceedings.
54. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (1964). There are, of course, many subtle forms of discrimination
which are difficult to prove and remedy. However, the Board's long years of experience in this
area should be sufficient to overcome this problem. In addition, the congressional intent in
forbidding discrimination for going to the Board was to prevent the Board's channels of
information from being dried up by the intimidation of complainants and witnesses. To
implement this intent the Board has broad powers to prevent all forms of discrimination that
affect its investigatory processes. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 191 F.2d 483
(D.C. Cir. 1951).
55. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (1964).
56. NLRB v. Southland Paint Co., 394 F.2d 717, 721 (5th Cir. 1968).
57. See note 54 supra.
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Witnesses in proceedings before most other agencies are not nearly
as vulnerable to intimidation as employee witnesses in unfair labor
practice and wage and hours cases. Therefore, any danger to the
witness because of disclosure of the parties' witness lists is likely to be
an unusual situation. When this danger does arise, protective orders
are available under Recommendation 8(b) to protect the witness. That
recommendation authorizes the presiding officer, upon a showing of
good cause, "to restrict or defer disclosure by a party of the name of a
witness . . . and to prescribe other appropriate measures to protect a
witness." The party seeking this exemption from disclosure must
produce substantial evidence, not just unverifiable fears, that
disclosure would endanger the witness. 58 Thus, agencies can develop,
under Recommendation 8, procedures to handle those few cases where
there is good cause for protecting a witness by keeping his identity
secret.
Even in cases where the agency staff does not obtain a protective
order, the identity of sensitive agency witnesses need not be disclosed
prematurely. Recommendation 1 presupposes that the presiding
officer will only require disclosure at some reasonable time prior to
the hearing. Thus, the agency staff can retain considerable flexibility
on the timing of disclosure and can protect a prospective witness from
needless exposure by delaying disclosure until after settlement
negotiations have failed and until it is clear that the witness' testimony
will be necessary at the hearing. Such a procedure may be appropriate
in some types of proceedings to insure that a person in a vulnerable
position will not be placed on a witness list until there is some
certainty that he will be called to testify at the hearing.
The provision in Recommendation 1 on the exchange of witness
lists goes further than the general discovery practice under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Generally, a party in a civil case need not
disclose the names of his trial witnesses. 9 Furthermore, Federal Rule
58. A similar procedure has developed in California where the prosecutor in criminal cases
must normally disclose the names of his witnesses prior to trial. In People v. Lopez, 60 Cal. 2d
223, 384 P.2d 16, 32 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1963), the Supreme Court of California held that the
prosecutor properly refused to disclose the names prior to trial of two key witnesses for the State
when two police officers had testified at an open hearing on the violent disposition of the
defendant and the genuine fears of the witnesses. The court affirmed the trial judge's order
deferring the disclosure of the witnesses' names until twenty-four hours prior to the time they
were to take the stand.
59. See, e.g., Wirtz v. Continental Finance and Loan Co., 326 F.2d 561 (5th Cir. 1964);
United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 25 F.R.D. 252 (D.N.J. 1960). See also 4 J. MooRE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE 26.57(4) (2d ed. 1970).
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16, dealing with pre-trial procedure, does not expressly authorize an
exchange of witness lists at a pre-trial conference. That rule simply
enumerates five non-discovery functions of the pre-trial conference
and then adds that the trial judge and the parties should consider
"such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action."
However, under this last provision many federal district courts require
parties to disclose the names of their witnesses at pre-trial. 0 This
practice is consistent with modern notions of discovery, for "[t]he
sporting theory of litigation thrives on surprise-including surprise
witnesses. Elimination of this sort of tactic is a legitimate purpose of
the discovery rules, especially when considered in connection with
Rule 16 on pre-trial proceedings."'' 6 This comment is just as
applicable to administrative adjudications as it is to civil trials. The
thrust of Recommendation 1 is to build the prehearing conference into
a significant discovery device for the full exchange of information and
thus to reduce the need for more expensive and dilatory means of
discovery.
DISCOVERY RECOMMENDATION 2-DEPOSITIONS
Depositions, particularly those taken on oral examination, have
proved to be the most useful and most widely used of the discovery
tools in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. They are also the most
expensive and slowest. Depositions are nevertheless vital in court cases
whose outcome may turn on a witness' remembrance or perception of
past events. So far they have been little used in agency adjudication.
While the great majority of agencies do have rules providing for the
taking of depositions, these rules generally do not authorize discovery
depositions but provide only for depositions to preserve the testimony
of a witness who is near death, about to leave the country, or for some
other reason unlikely to testify at the hearing. The experience of those
agencies which have provided for discovery depositions has been
inconclusive. 62
Recommendation 2 provides for the limited use of discovery
depositions in agency adjudications. The recommendation allows
60. See, e.g.. United States v. 216 Bottles, 36 F.R.D. 695 (E.D.N.Y. 1965); United States v.
Shubert, II F.R.D. 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Kling v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 9 F.R.D. 604
(S.D. Fla. 1949).
61. 4 J. MooRE, supra note 59, 26.57(4), at 26-212.
62. A growing number of agencies permit depositions for discovery purposes. See e.g., 14
C.F.R. § 13.53 (1969) (FAA); 16 C.F.R. § 3.33 (1970) (FTC); 46 C.F.R. §§ 502.201-.205
(1970) (FMC); 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.315-.316 (1970) (FCC).
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depositions to be taken by oral examination or written questions for
purposes of discovering relevant, unprivileged information; if the
situation requires it, a recalcitrant deponent may be compelled to
testify through the issuance by the agency of a subpoena ad
testificandum. By placing six major conditions on the taking of
depositions, this recommendation takes into account the fact that
depositions are a new tool in administrative adjudications and
recognizes that their overuse may result in serious delays. These
conditions reflect the basic assumption that in many adjudicatory
proceedings the parties can obtain adequate discovery through the
prehearing conference and through orders for the production of
documents without any need for taking depositions.13 Taking
depositions in these instances will only make the administrative
process slower and more expensive than it already is.
While Recommendation 2 thus places significant limitations on
the taking of depositions, it recognizes that fairness requires that
parties to adjudicatory proceedings be able to take depositions. Most
agencies do encounter cases where there are factual conflicts which
must be resolved by testimony of witnesses. Surprise should play no
part in these proceedings, and the parties should be able to find out
before the hearing what testimony to expect from the principal
witnesses against them. Depositions allow a party to do this and also
are necessary to permit the parties to the proceeding-particularly
private parties-to obtain full knowledge of the relevant facts. Often
counsel for a private party will encounter a recalcitrant individual
who refuses to cooperate and disclose the evidence and leads of which
he has knowledge. In this situation, agency counsel normally has the
power to issue an investigatory subpoena and compel cooperation. 4
Recommendation 2 is largely premised on the fact that fairness
requires that respondent's counsel also have the power to compel the
disclosure of all relevant, unprivileged information by obtaining a
subpoena to take the deposition of the witness.6 5
63. The CAB has found that depositions for purposes of discovery are rarely necessary
where other discovery techniques, such as the prehearing conference and ready access to agency
files, are widely used. CAB proceedings, however, primarily involve applications for new or
amended route operating authority where the facts are rarely in dispute and much of the
testimony of witnesses is required to be reduced to written form. Maurer, supra note 42.
64. See, e.g., 14 C.F.R. § 13.3 (1969) (FAA); 16 C.F.R. § 2.7 (1970) (FTC).
65. This problem is particularly severe in unfair labor practice cases before the NLRB
where respondents encounter uncooperative witnesses when they interview their own employees
or union members. In these cases there is the complicating factor that employees may well feel
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Conditions on the Taking of Depositions. Recommendation 2
places six conditions on the taking of depositions in agency
adjudications. The first condition provides that the taking of
depositions should normally be deferred until there has been at least
one prehearing conference.6" Discovery by deposition in
administrative adjudications should come only after the prehearing
conference, since the conference should serve as the preeminent
discovery device. If the conference functions smoothly, there may be
little need for further discovery. At the prehearing conference there
should be a narrowing of the issues and a determination of what
discovery is really necessary. Once the issues have been narrowed,
much of the information the parties anticipated obtaining through
discovery may no longer be relevant. Furthermore, once the
respondent learns at the prehearing conference what evidence the
agency plans to introduce against him, he may decide that it is no
longer necessary to have as much formal discovery as he had
anticipated. 7 Normally the presiding officer should deny an
application to take a deposition if he has not yet held a prehearing
pressured by the inquiries of their employer or union. Under present law, it is proper for a
respondent employer to interview his employees about matters alleged in an unfair labor practice
complaint as long as he does not inquire about the contents of any statements they have made to
the NLRB or ask them for copies thereof. Texas Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 336 F.2d 128, 133-34
(5th Cir. 1964). However, employees often refuse to cooperate in these interviews. Counsel may
seek relief by demanding that the Board allow him to take the employees' depositions, but the
General Counsel's Office takes the position that the applicable statute, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-165
(1964), and regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 102.30 (1970), do not provide for depositions or other
prehearing discovery in such cases. See, e.g., NLRB v. Globe Wireless, Ltd., 193 F.2d 748 (9th
Cir. 1951). Contra, NLRB v. Safeway Steel Scaffolds Co., 383 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1967). Some
courts, however, have interpreted section 10(b) of the Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-
Hartley Act), 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1964), which requires that unfair labor practice proceedings
shall "so far as practicable be conducted in accordance with the rules of evidence applicable in
the district courts of the United States," to authorize prehearing discovery and have indicated
that the Board should provide discovery in appropriate cases. NLRB v. Southern Materials Co.,
345 F.2d 240, 244 (4th Cir. 1965); NLRB v. Vapor Blast Mfg. Co., 287 F.2d 402,407 (7th Cir.
1961).
The General Counsel's Office does have a genuine concern that the use of prehearing
depositions will lead to delay. However, this interest must be balanced against the fact that
taking depositions insures that all parties to the proceeding have full knowledge of the relevant
facts. In addition the employee will have committed himself by testifying under oath and will be
protected under 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (1964) from discharge or other discrimination because of
his testimony. See notes 54-57 supra and accompanying text.
66. In civil litigation in the federal courts the pre-trial conference normally occurs only after
the parties have completed their discovery through depositions and interrogatories and when the
trial date is rapidly approaching. 3 MooRE, supra note 59, at 16.08.
67. Lewis, Discovery Techniques and the Protection of Confidential Data in FTC
Proceedings, 21 AD. L. REv. 457, 460-64 (1969).
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conference with the parties. However, cases may arise which are too
straight-forward to justify calling a prehearing conference, and where
a party may have good cause for taking one or two depositions. The
presiding officer should have authority in cases such as these to order
the taking of the depositions without first holding a prehearing
conference.6"
Federal judges have adopted a similar procedure to handle
protracted cases. That procedure recognizes that the judge in the
"big" case must maintain firm control over the discovery proceedings
and must hold pre-trial conferences at an early stage to define the
issues and place reasonable bounds on discovery.6" Discovery must
follow a similar course in routine administrative adjudications if the
administrative process is to survive as a quick, inexpensive way to
adjudicate controversies. Litigants in the federal courts often can
afford to spend several years on discovery because congested court
calenders do not permit a speedy trial; agencies cannot afford such
delays if they are to enforce the law and uphold the public interest. It
is important, therefore, that the presiding officer restrict the number
and timing of depositions by holding a prehearing conference as early
as possible in the proceeding.
The second condition on the taking of depositions requires that the
party seeking a deposition apply to the presiding officer for an order
to do so. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure a party may take
the deposition of a witness upon notice to the other parties and
without any need for a court order or showing of good cause.7"
Recommendation 2 does not adopt this practice but instead provides
68. The FCC's limited experience with its new discovery rules demonstrates the soundness of
holding a prehearing conference before the parties are allowed to take depositions or pursue
other means of discovery. The FCC discovery rules follow the normal federal practice and
provide that the taking of depositions and the serving of written interrogatories "shall be
completed prior to the initial prehearing conference" unless the presiding officer orders
otherwise. 47 C.F.R. § 1.311(c) (1970). FCC hearing examiners have on the whole reacted
unfavorably to that agency's new discovery rules because the rules have placed discovery too
early in the process and have upset what had been a smoothly functioning prehearing procedure
in which the examiners had required the parties to exchange their evidentiary exhibits and
generally to disclose their cases.
69. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, HANDBOOK OF RECOMMENDED
PROCEDURES FOR THE TRIAL OF PROTRACTED CASES. 25 F.R.D. 351, 385-98 (1960). Similar
procedures are necessary for the protracted administrative case. ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE
OF THE UNITED STATES, COMMITTEE ON INFORMATION AND EDUCATION, RECOMMENDED
PROCEDURES FOR PROTRACTED HEARINGS BEFORE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 10-21 (Second
Draft 1963).
70. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(a).
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that the presiding officer must issue an order for the taking of a
deposition; this gives him firm control over the discovery stage of the
proceeding. The next three conditions require that the other parties to
the proceeding receive notice of the application to take the deposition
and have, along with the deponent, an opportunity to contest the
issuance of an order. The presiding officer should not issue the order if
he finds that the taking of the deposition would result in undue delay;
if there will be no undue delay, the presiding officer should issue the
order unless he finds that there is not good cause for taking the
deposition.
Since an order will issue unless there is a finding that "good
cause" does not exist, this provision shifts the burden of persuasion
on this issue from the applicant to the party or person opposing the
deposition. 7 The applicant therefore does not need to disclose in his
application why he wants to depose a particular witness. "Good
cause" cannot be defined in the abstract but would normally involve
some need on the part of the applicant to obtain information from the
deponent. The presiding officer, however, should not deny reasonable
requests for depositions simply because he is unsure what information
would be uncovered. On the other hand, "good cause" may not exist
where the applicant seeks to depose a prospective witness and where
the opposing party has complied with Recommendation 3 by
furnishing a narrative summary of the witness' expected testimony
and, in the case of an agency witness, any prior statements of the
witness relevant to the expected testimony. Unless the applicant
demonstrates that the witness' credibility or perception of disputed
events is a significant part of his expected testimony, the applicant
does not have good cause to depose him since the deposition would not
furnish the applicant with any additional relevant information.
The sixth and final condition in Recommendation 2 limits the
deposing of agency employees. Agencies generally resist the
application of this form of discovery against themselves.72 Basic
fairness, however, requires that a private party to an agency
adjudication be able to subpoena an agency employee to testify at the
hearing regarding at least his first-hand knowledge of the case.73
71. Nothing in Recommendation 2 prohibits the presiding officer from finding on his own
initiative that good cause does not exist even though no one opposes the taking of the deposition.
Such occurrences, however, should prove rare.
72. Only the FMC allows a private party routinely to take a deposition of an agency
employee. 46 C.F.R. § 502.209 (1970).
73. See, e.g., NLRB v. Capitol Fish Co., 294 F.2d 868 (5th Cir. 1961).
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Otherwise the private party will be foreclosed from fully presenting
his side of the case, and the presiding officer will decide the case on
less than all the available facts. If the purposes behind discovery are to
be fully carried out, the private party should be able to take the
employee's deposition to learn, prior to the hearing, the facts of which
he has knowledge and about which he would testify. There is a danger,
however, that private parties will abuse this right. Employees of
already understaffed agencies will have to spend a day or so being
deposed when their time could be much better spent in the public
service. Furthermore, interrogatories directed to the agency may
supply the private party with all the information he needs. 74
Recommendation 2(6) provides a fair and workable compromise on
this issue which relieves the agency staff of the burden of depositions
in routine cases while allowing a private party to take the deposition
of an agency employee in the unusual case where there is a real need to
do so. The presiding officer, who is more familiar with the case than
the agency head or members, must initially decide whether the party
applying to take the desposition is seeking "significant, unprivileged
information not discoverable by alternative means." Any order of the
presiding officer granting an application to depose an agency
employee is subject to an interlocutory appeal to the agency.7"
Recommendation 2(6) does place those agencies with adjudicatory
powers at an advantage over those agencies which must enforce the
law through civil actions in the federal district courts. The latter
agencies are subject to the deposition provisions of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, which make no exception for agency personnel."
The taking of these depositions does not seem to hinder the work of
the agencies involved or hurt their performance. While depositions of
agency personnel are thus relatively common in the federal courts,
some courts seem to feel that written interrogatories are the preferred
method for obtaining discovery from an agency.7
74. These points evidently influenced the FCC to prohibit the deposing of FCC personnel
"except on special order of the Commission." 47 C.F.R. § 1.31 l(b)(2) (1970).
75. Depositions of agency members are not covered by Recommendation 2. Since agency
members function primarily as judges, only in rare instances should they be subpoenaed to
testify at the prehearing stage or at the hearing itself. San Francisco Mining Exch., 41 S.E.C.
860 (1964), affd, 378 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1967). See also note 112 infra and accompanying text.
76. FED. R. Civ. P. 26-32. FDA laboratory personnel and consultants are frequently
deposed in seizure and injunction actions brought against mislabeled or adulterated food and
drugs. To a lesser extent, Wage and Hours Inspectors in the Department of Labor have their
depositions taken by employers defending cases brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act.
77. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 24 AD. L.2D 1099 (E.D. La. 1969).
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DISCOVERY RECOMMENDATION 3: WITNESSES
Recommendation 3(a) requires the agency to produce prior to
the hearing any prior "statements"-as defined in the
recommendation-of agency witnesses-which are in the possession of
the agency or obtainable by it from any other federal agency and
which relate to the subject matter of the expected testimony. The
recommendation only applies to adjudications where the agency staff
participates as a party. Recommendation 3(b), on the other hand,
requires all parties to an adjudicatory proceeding to produce prior to
the hearing the names of the witnesses they expect to call and
narrative summaries of their expected testimony. Both
recommendations are flexible on matters of timing and only require
the production of the statements and summaries at a prehearing
conference or at some other "reasonable time" prior to the hearing.
The recommendation assumes that the parties will normally resolve
among themselves scheduling problems which arise. The presiding
officer, of course, retains ultimate control over the discovery process
and should resolve any disputes between the parties. In cases where
the presiding officer holds a prehearing conference under
Recommendation 1,78 he should arrange at that time for the
production of the statements and summaries. This production could
be contemporaneous with or subsequent to the exchange of witness
lists contemplated by Recommendation 1. The dual purposes behind
Recommendations 3(a) and 3(b) are to insure full discovery-
particularly to private parties to the proceedings-and to obviate the
need for extensive, time-consuming depositions of prospective wit-
nesses. To understand the effect of these recommendations it is first
necessary to consider the development of the Jencks rule and existing
agency practices with respect to witness testimony.
In Jencks v. United States79 the Supreme Court formulated a
general rule of evidence that a defendant in a federal criminal case is
entitled to all prior statements by prosecution witnesses in the
possession of the prosecution which concern the same events and
activities as the witnesses' testimony. Following the decisions in
78. Recommendations 3(a) and 3(b) require production by the parties whether or not there is
a prehearing conference. The successful operation of these recommendations, however, may
often depend on the presiding officer holding a prehearing conference and asserting his control
over the discovery process.
79. 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
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Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board"° and
NLRB v. Adhesive Products Corp.,8' the application of the Jencks
rule to administrative adjudications and to agency enforcement
actions brought in the courts has been uniformly accepted. The basis
for the rule is that the government, in enforcing the law, must "play
fair" with the defendant or respondent. Agency rules and decisions
generally reflect or copy the Jencks Act,12 in which Congress codified
and restricted the Jencks decision. Under that statute a defendant in a
federal criminal prosecution is entitled to any prior "statement" by a
government witness which relates to the subject matter of the
testimony after that witness has testified on direct examination. Pre-
trial production of such statements is not authorized." "Statement"
is narrowly defined to include only a signed or adopted written
statement or a recording or transcription which is substantially a
verbatim recital of an oral statement." Both the Jencks decision and
Jencks Act make clear that the reason for requiring production of
prior statements is to permit defense counsel to impeach or otherwise
discredit the government's witnesses at trial.
In administering the Jencks rule agencies have generally followed
the definition of "statement" in the Jencks Act and have delayed the
production of prior statements until after the witness has completed
his direct testimony."' Agencies have resisted the prehearing disclosure
of a witness' prior statements on the grounds that they deserve
confidential treatment as part of the agency's investigatory files and
work product. Agencies have also invoked the informer's privilege to
prevent the prehearing disclosure of the statements of witnesses. Of
80. 254 F.2d 314 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
81. 258 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1958).
82. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1964). The Jencks Act by its terms applies only to federal criminal
prosecutions and not to agency adjudications.
83. Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 349 (1959).
84. The term "statement". . . means-
1. a written statement made by said witness and signed or otherwise adopted or
approved by him; or
2. a . . . recording, or a transcription thereof, which is a substantially verbatim
recital of an oral statement made by said witness to an agent of the Government and
recorded contemporaneously with the making of such oral statement. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3500(e) (1964).
85. 29 C.F.R. § 102.118(b) (1970) (NLRB).
86. Both the Wage and Hours Administration in the Department of Labor and the NLRB
have strongly resisted the pre-trial disclosure of informer's statements, or even of the fact that a
person supplied information. Despite broad provisions for discovery in the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure court decisions in enforcement actions under the Fair Labor Standards Act have
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course, the informer's statements themselves are producible under the
Jencks rule once the informer takes the witness stand. At that point
the respondent or defendant learns for the first time whether the
witness served as an informer and gave a prior statement.
The FTC goes one step further by allowing its investigators to take
down statements from informers who are prospective agency
witnesses in a non-verbatim fashion with the result that they are not
normally producible, even at the hearing itself, under the FTC's
version of the Jencks rule.87 The FTC maintains that these interview
reports are generally not the "statement" of the witness but the
subjective summary of the investigator and therefore should not be
available to the respondent even for impeachment purposes.8" This
practice has been sharply criticized"9 since it deprives respondents of
information which might prove useful on cross-examination.
Exculpatory material may also remain buried in the files when the
interview reports are not produced at the hearing after the witness
testifies."0 The practice almost uniformly followed by other agencies is
for the interviewer to arrange for a verbatim transcription of the
informer's oral statement or to have the informer sign or adopt a
written statement. Such statements are of course producible under the
Jencks rule when the informer testifies at the hearing and can prove
quite valuable to respondent in cross-examination of the informer.
The FTC itself follows this practice in cases where the staff determines
generally upheld the Department of Labor's claim of the informer's privilege in refusing to
disclose the identity of its informants and to produce their statements. Wirtz v. B. A. C. Steel
Products, Inc., 312 F.2d 14 (4th Cir. 1962); Mitchell v. Roma, 265 F.2d 633 (3d Cir. 1959).
Contra, Wirtz v. Rosenthal, 388 F.2d 290 (9th Cir. 1967). The Department's claim of privilege
has even been upheld when it refused to disclose prior to trial whether a prospective witness was
an informer who had given a prior statement. Wirtz v. Robinson & Stephens, lpc., 368 F.2d 114
(5th Cir. 1966). The FTC has achieved the same result by claiming that informers' statements
constitute part of the agency's work product and are not discoverable under the agency's rules
for prehearing discovery. Allied Chemical Corp., [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
318,654, at 21,020 (FTC 1969).
87. L.G. Balfour, Co., [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 17,532, at 22,792
(FTC 1966); Inter-State Builders, Inc., [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. f
17,532, at 22,792 (FTC 1966).
88. Inter-State Builders, Inc., [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. $ 17,532, at
22,792 (FTC 1966); Star Office Supply Co., [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. T
18,520, at 20,874 (FTC 1968) (Commissioner Elman dissented in both cases).
89. E. Gellhorn, The Treatment of Confidential Information by the Federal Trade
Commission: The Hearing, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 401,428-33 (1968).
90. See note 9 supra.
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that the strong testimony of witnesses will be needed to prove the
agency's case.91
Discovery Recommendation 3(a). Recommendation 3(a)
transforms the Jencks rule from a rule of evidence into a rule of
discovery. Since the prohibition of the Jencks Act on pre-trial
discovery of prior statements and its restrictive definition of
"statement" apply only to federal criminal prosecutions and not to
agency adjudications,92 administrative agencies are free to adopt more
liberal policies on disclosure of an agency witness' prior statements.
Recommendation 3(a) therefore broadens the definition of
"statement" and proposes that the agency produce the prior
statements of its witnesses at the prehearing stage, rather than at the
completion of each witness' direct testimony.
Recommendation 3(a)'s definition of "statement" resembles the
definition of "statement" in the Jencks Act 93 but is less complex and
technical. The recommendation's definition includes any "written
statement signed or adopted by the witness or a recording or
transcription which is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral
statement made by the witness to an agent of the Federal
government." Basically, the recommendation should encourage
agencies to adopt a liberal policy on the production of statements and
to produce any statements which accurately reflect the witness' own
words. This definition omits any requirement, such as that found in
the Jencks Act, that the recording of the oral statement must be a
"contemporaneous" recording. The basis for this omission is that if
the agency has a statement containing the actual words of the witness
it should be willing to produce that statement and to hold the witness
to his words. The fact that the statement was not recorded
contemporaneously or that the original, contemporaneous recording
has been destroyed or disappeared should not prevent the production
of a subsequent recording. The agency normally has the means to
insure that any subsequent recording or transcription of the
recollections or report of a government interviewer is accurate and
complete.94
91. The SEC on the other hand follows this practice in all cases and applies a much more
liberal Jencks rule than does the FTC. The SEC produces, often before a witness' direct
testimony or even before the hearing itself, anything in its files which might be considered a prior
statement.
92. See note 82supra.
93. See note 84 supra.
94. The broadened definition of "statement," however, is not intended to cover efforts by
the interviewer months or years after the interview to reconstruct from memory the contents of a
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Both the Jencks Act and Recommendation 3(a) define "state-
ment" in a way that limits the government's duty to produce re-
cordings and transcriptions of oral statements to those recordings
and transcriptions which are "substantially verbatim" recitals. The
agency need not produce an interviewer's summary of or excerpts
from the oral statement of a witness. 5 The American Bar
Association's Advisory Committee on Pretrial Practices has rejected
this limitation for criminal trials.9" This view carries considerable
force; a defendant should be permitted to know in advance the
substance of the testimony against him. However, furnishing defense
counsel with the work papers of the prosecutot, as the Committee
recommends, is an awkward way to accomplish this goal. Not only
does it tempt the prosecutor to destroy such papers or not to write
anything down, it also constitutes an intrusion into the internal
operation of the prosecutor's office. Recommendation 3(b) adopts a
different approach to achieve in administrative proceedings the same
goal of informing the charged party of the substance of the testimony
against him without requiring production of agency work papers. If
the agency staff does not have a "statement" of a witness covered by
the definition of "statement" in Recommendation 3(a), it must still
comply with Recommendation 3(b) by furnishing the other parties to
the proceeding with a narrative summary of the witness' expected
testimony. The staff will be identified as the author of the narrative
summary which will not constitute a statement of the witness' for
impeachment purposes. The respondent will have discovered the
substance of the testimony against him without having unduly pried
into the agency's investigatory files.
witness' statement. The resulting product is unlikely to be "substantially verbatim" and may
not fairly be characterized as a "recording" of the original statement.
95. See Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 352-53 (1959).
96. ABA DISCOVERY STANDARDS 61-63. Standard 2.1(a)(i) proposed by the Committee
simply requires the pretrial production of the "relevant written or recorded statements" of the
government's witnesses. The Commentary accompanying this provision states that the
"Advisory Committee intends that the term ["statement"] be given a broad meaning so as to
include generally any utterances of the statement-giver which are recorded by any means in
whole or in part, and regardless of to whom they were made. ... Id. at 61-62. This Standard
thus requires the production of all interview notes, even if the notes are only jottings to aid the
investigator in later compiling his formal report. Production is not required, however, of those
portions of an interview report which contain the investigator's impressions and summary. In
the opinion of the Advisory Committee, "statements" of government Witnesses that do not
contain substantially verbatim the words of the statement-giver should still prove useful to
defense counsel in preparation for plea or trial even though such statements should play a
restricted role in the impeachment of the witness. Id. at 63.
Vol. 1971:89]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
Recommendation 3(a) also conforms with the Jencks Act in
requiring the production of all prior written statements signed or
adopted by a witness, regardless of to whom the statements were
made, as well as of the recordings of all prior oral statements made by
the witness to an agent of the federal government. The statements need
only be relevant to the expected testimony and "in the possession of
the agency or obtainable by it from any other Federal agency." Thus,
the agency cannot refuse production of prior statements simply
because the statements were given to another federal agency and
repose in its files.9 7 Agencies must seek to obtain such statements to
insure that their own proceedings are fair. Federal agencies should
cooperate and share the statements in their files with other agencies
when the need arises. The Jencks Act itself demands no less; it requires
the United States Attorney in a criminal prosecution to produce all
relevant prior statements "in the possession of the United
States .. "98
Prehearing production of the prior statements of agency witnesses
should have a beneficial effect in speeding up the adjudicatory
process. The respondent or other private party learns what the
witnesses against him have to say and can determine prior to the
hearing if further discovery is necessary to refute the testimony of
such witnesses. The ABA had the same goal in mind in formulating a
similar recommendation for criminal trials. The ABA's suggested
Standard 2.1 (a)(i) 9 provides that the prosecutor must produce, prior
to trial, the relevant written and recorded statements of the witnesses
he intends to call. The ABA Committee acknowledged that pre-trial
disclosure of such statements is not the norm in the overwhelming
majority of jurisdictions, but based its recommendation on four
"fundamental principles":
(1) fairness requires that the statements be disclosed during trial in any event;
(2) if the disclosures are made prior to trial, the delays and attendant
inconveniences occasioned by disclosure during trial will be avoided; (3) for
adequate preparation and to minimize surprise, disclosures should be made
prior to trial; and (4) any valid reason for denying or delaying a given
disclosure can be taken account of by the trial judge [in formulating a
protective order for a particular case]. '0
97. Agency rules may not limit the availability of prior statements to those which are in the
.possession of the particular federal agency conducting the hearing. Harvey Aluminum v.
NLRB, 335 F.2d 749,754 (9th Cir. 1964).
98. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b) (1964).
99. ABA DiSCOveRY STANDARDS 13.
100. Id. at 57-58. The inconveniences associated with delaying the production of Jencks
statements until the completion of a witness' direct testimony have already prompted many
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These fundamental principles are equally applicable to administrative
adjudications. The prehearing production of these statements should
furnish the respondent or other private party with considerable
discovery and significantly reduce his need to take depositions and
pursue other formal means of discovery. This beneficial effect on the
discovery process was of great importance in formulating both
Recommendations 3(a) and 3(b).
Agencies should generously comply with Recommendation 3(a)
and should not adopt investigatory practices which circumvent it.
Investigators should be instructed to take the statement of a witness in
such a way that the statement is producible under this
recommendation. Personal observations and comments of the
investigator should be reported separately and not included in the
witness' statement. This is a sound way to take a statement; it
separates the witness' words, which are producible, and the
interviewer's reactions, which are not. 0 1 Agencies should also
generously favor discovery in determining whether a particular
statement is "substantially verbatim." The standard intended to be
followed here is that applied by the federal courts under the Jencks
Act and not some narrower standard formulated by an agency. For a
statement to be producible it need not be precisely verbatim or
contain the exact words and punctuation of the witness.0 2 Indeed,
under the judicial practice the defendant generally obtains any
statements that record with substantial accuracy and completeness
what the witness said. 0 3
federal trial judges, without clear authority to do so, to require the prosecution to produce the
statements at an earlier stage. Id. at 58. See generally United States v. Owens-Corning
Fiberglass Corp., 271 F. Supp. 561, 570-71 (N.D. Cal. 1967); Recommended Procedures in
Criminal Pretrials, 37 F.R.D. 45, 102 (1965); Kaufman, The Apalachian Trial: Further
Observations on Pre-Trial in Criminal Cases, 44 J. AM. JUD. Soc. 53, 55 (1960).
101. The contrary practice of FTC investigators, notes 87-91 supra, who generally combine
in their reports both the witness' statements and their own impressions, has come close to
making the Jencks rule a "dead letter" at the FTC. Interstate Builders, Inc., [1965-1967
Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 17,532, at 22,812 (FTC 1966) (Commissioner Elman
dissenting).
102. United States v. McKeever, 271 F.2d 669, 675 (2d Cir. 1959).
103. Judicial standards should also govern situations where the investigator himself or some
other agency employee becomes a witness for the agency in the proceeding. Reports that contain
his reactions to-and recommendations on--the case and other internal working documents
prepared by him are not "statements" under the Jencks Act. However, if the agency employee
testifies concerning his knowledge of the facts or concerning an interview with a witness, his
report on these factual matters are written "statements" that must be produced. Karp v. United
States, 277 F.2d 843 (8th Cir. 1960).
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Recommendation 3(a) does not upset the legitimate desire of
agencies to protect the confidentiality of their informers. The Jencks
rule already compels the agency to disclose at the time a witness
testifies whether or not he was an informer who gave a prior
statement. No one presently disputes this as a requirement of fair
play. If the agency wants to keep its informer secret, it cannot call him
as a witness. All that the recommendation requires is that the agency
disclose at an earlier point that a witness it plans to call was an
informer who gave a prior statement. The agency retains considerable
flexibility in timing the disclosure, which may take place at a
prehearing conference or at some other reasonable time prior to the
hearing and may be either contemporaneous with or subsequent to the
exchange of witness lists required by Recommendations 1 and 3(b).
The present recommendation also should not handicap agencies in
obtaining statements from informers because an agency can still
promise its informers adequate confidentiality. °0
The prehearing disclosure of the prior statements of agency
witnesses should result in greater fairness in agency adjudication
without any undue impingement on the confidential nature of
investigatory files and "work product." While such a procedure may
require the agency to disclose some of its work product, the Jencks
rule already requires that, and to this extent is at odds with the
protection afforded work product by Hickman v. Taylor.' When a
government agency enforces the law, the demands of fair play may
sometimes require that the agency not retain its work product but
104. The NLRB provides a good case in point. Presently the NLRB promises informers that
their identities and statements will be kept confidential until they are called to testify. Under this
recommendation, NLRB investigators can still promise informers that their identities and
statements will be kept confidential until a formal proceeding is instituted and they are
designated as witnesses. It is hard to see how disclosing at the prehearing stage the fact that a
witness was an informer and gave a statement will expose that witness to any greater reprisals
than will disclosure at the hearing itself, as required by the present Jencks rule. See NLRB v.
Schill Steel Prods., Inc., 408 F.2d 803, 807 (5th Cir. 1969) (denying petition for rehearing).
Schill was a contempt proceeding where the Fifth Circuit appointed a special master with
authority to order that the agency permit the respondent to discover all statements made to the
NLRB or its agents by witnesses whom the agency planned to call at the contempt hearing. The
decision approved this form of discovery and distinguished it from the discovery denied in
NLRB v. Clement Bros., 407 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1969), where the respondent in an unfair labor
practice case demanded all informer's statements in the NLRB's possession and not just those
of prospective witnesses. To require the production of all statements would in effect abolish the
informer's privilege. The General Counsel's Office, however, does not acquiesce even in the
Schill decision.
105. 329 U.S. 495 (1947). See Cleary, Hickman v. Jencks, 14 VAND. L. REv. 865 (1961).
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make it available to the respondent or other private party to the
proceeding. While this disclosure requirement normally should not
apply to the work papers or subjective impressions of agency
personnel, it should apply to the prior statements of witnesses
obtained by the agency. These statements are not only useful to the
respondent for impeachment purposes but are also useful at the
discovery stage to help the respondent prepare for the hearing.
Discovery Recommendation 3(b). Recommendation 3(b) seeks to
insure that a party to an adjudicatory proceeding obtains adequate
discovery of the testimony of his adversary's witnesses without the
need for the time-consuming and expensive process of taking their
depositions. Recommendation 2 provides for depositions on oral
examination and on written questions; a party may find it necessary,
or be tempted for purposes of delay, to depose all the potential
witnesses against him. A counsel for respondent or other private party
who is interested in delay may even stage a "dry run" of the trial by
deposing all the agency's witnesses. Recommendation 3(b) controls
this practice by furnishing the party with narrative summaries of the
witnesses' expected testimony; it thus becomes unnecessary in a great
many instances to take depositions.l1e
Recommendation 3(b) suggests requiring all parties to the
proceeding, and not just the agency, to furnish at some reasonable
time prior to the hearing narrative summaries of the expected
testimony of their witnesses. Recommendation 3(a), on the other
hand, only requires the agency staff, and not private parties, to
produce prior statements of witnesses. The fact that private parties
need produce only narrative summaries and not the prior statements
106. The FTC has had considerable experience with the problem of delay associated with
attempts to depose agency witnesses. At one time it met the problem by taking the position that
its Rule 3.33 on depositions, 16 C.F.R. § 3.33 (1970), did not permit the deposing of complaint
counsel's witnesses on matters with regard to which they were expected to testify at the hearing.
Associated Merchandising Corp., [1967-70 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. RP. 18,102, at
20,547 (FTC 1967). The FTC has changed its position and now permits depositions for the
purpose of discovering the testimony of prospective witnesses. Koppers Company, FTC Dkt.
No. 8755 (July 2, 1968) (unreported). While the latter decision is more consistent with the
purposes of discovery, the deposing of agency witnesses is expensive, time-consuming, may delay
the hearing, and is not always really necessary. Some FTC examiners are now meeting this
problem by requiring complaint counsel to furnish respondent with a narrative summary of the
expected testimony of each agency witness. When the respondent learns the substance of the
witnesses' testimony in this fashion, he often decides that there is no need to take the trouble of
deposing them. If the respondent is not satisfied with the narration, he can ask that he be given a
clarification or a further narrative statement. This procedure has worked well in a number of
FTC cases to reduce significantly the number of depositions needed.
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of their witnesses can be explained on several grounds: the Jencks rule,
which has been transformed by Recommendation 3(a) into a rule of
discovery, presently only applies to government witnesses; the
government's superior ability in obtaining statements and its interest
in uncovering the truth rather than in winning the case combine to
subject to it more readily to the fairness requirement that it share its
statements with the other parties; and the work-product rule and the
attorney-client privilege more readily protect statements obtained by
private parties and their privately retained attorneys than those
obtained by government investigators. These considerations do not
apply to the prehearing production of the narrative -summary of a
witness' expected testimony where the goal is to avoid surprise at the
hearing by informing the other parties of the witness' position. The
agency, too, should be protected against surprise at the hearing and
should be permitted to know ahead of time the essential elements of
the testimony against it. 107 Discovery must be a two-way street.
Agency counsel in an adjudicatory proceeding must comply with
both Recommendation 3(b) on narrative summaries and
Recommendation 3(a) on prior statements. This dual requirement
should not prove too burdensome because in most cases agency
'counsel should be able to satisfy the requirement that he make
available a narrative summary of the expected testimony of an agency
witness by simply designating one or more of that witness' prior
statements as a "narrative summary." Recommendation 3(b)
specifically authorizes him to do that.' However, agency counsel
retains the option of drafting his own narrative summary rather than
relying on the witness' prior statements.
Recommendation 3(b) also requires the prehearing exchange
between the parties of the names of their witnesses. If the parties must
make available narrative summaries of the expected testimony of their
witnesses, they are in effect disclosing their witness lists. This feature
of Recommendation 3(b) supplements the provision in
Recommendation 1 on the exchange of witness lists. The provision in
Recommendation 1 on the exchange between the parties of evidentiary
107. The "reasonable time prior to the hearing" for the respondent or other private party to
produce the narrative summaries for his witnesses may be, for the great majority of cases,
subsequent to the time the agency produces its narrative summaries. Fairness may require that
the agency disclose its case first.
108. If agency counsel ascertains that the prior statements are incomplete summaries of the
testimony he expects from the witness, he must supplement the statements with a narrative
summary of the omitted areas of testimony.
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exhibits and witness lists only applies if the presiding officer holds a
prehearing conference and directs the parties to make the exchange.
While that recommendation gives the presiding officer the authority
to do both of those things, his decisions are largely discretionary and
he may choose not to hold a prehearing conference or to hold a
conference but not to direct the exchange. Recommendation 3(b)
insures that there will be a mutual disclosure of witness lists and of
narrative summaries prior to the heating regardless of the action of
the presiding officer. The mutual exchange of evidentiary exhibits,
however, remains dependent on favorable action by the presiding
officer under Recommendation 1. This difference in treatment
between witness lists and evidentiary exhibits is sound because in a
significant number of cases the disclosure of the names of witnesses is
a simple matter which the parties can readily handle among
themselves, while the exchange of exhibits may become quite complex
and function smoothly only if the presiding officer asserts control over
the process.
It must be acknowledged, however, that the preparation of witness
lists and of narrative summaries of the witnesses' expected testimony
imposes significant burdens on the parties and their counsel.
Furthermore, the timing of the exchange and the adequacy of the
narrative summaries may often raise questions requiring the
intervention of the presiding officer, who may find it advisable to call
a prehearing conference to resolve them. These disadvantages are
more than offset by the advantages of the significant discovery
afforded to the parties. Once the exchange has taken place the parties
may also be able to agree among themselves to introduce at the
hearing much of the witnesses' testimony in written form. Such
agreements should greatly shorten the time required for the hearing.' °9
Development of procedures allowing all testimony to be in writing
and providing that the full texts of the testimony be exchanged prior
to the hearing should be encouraged wherever appropriate because
109. A number of agencies, most notably the ICC and the CAB, have in fact developed
special procedures whereby the parties to a proceeding exchange prior to the hearing the
complete narrative testimony of their witnesses. These procedures, which go beyond the
minimum standards proposed by Recommendation 3(b), are particularly suitable for economic
proceedings where the primary facts are not really in dispute. See also E. Gellhorn, Rules of
Evidence and Official Notice in Formal Administrative Hearings, 1971 DuKI L.J. 1; E.
Gellhorn & W. Robinson, Summary Judgment in Administrative Adjudication, 84 HARV. L.
RFv. 612 (1971).
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these procedures serve the dual objectives of providing the parties with
full discovery and of expediting the course of the hearing. 10
Limited Role of Depositions. These discovery recommendations
recognize that the most effective means of discovery in administrative
adjudications. is the mutual exchange of information between the
parties, a process which functions best under the direction of the
presiding officer at a prehearing conference. Other, more formal
means of discovery, such as the taking of depositions, play a
secondary role; they only provide a party with discovery of
information that he was unable to obtain through mutual exchanges.
A party who obtains an informative narrative summary of the
expected testimony of his opponent's witness may conclude that he
has no need to depose that witness. If the party seeks to depose the
witness after receiving the summary, the presiding officer may find
under Recommendation 2(5) that the party does not have good cause
to take the deposition."' Recommendations 3(a) and 3(b) thus
operate jointly to limit the respondent's need to depose agency
witnesses. Only in a limited number of instances should the
respondent have good cause for deposing an agency witness when he
has already obtained a narrative summary of the witness' expected
testimony and any prior statements of the witness relevant to the
expected testimony.12
DISCOVERY RECOMMENDATION 4: WRITTEN INTERROGATORIES TO
PARTIES
Interrogatories to parties, provided for in Rule 33 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, have been widely employed in litigation in
the federal courts. Once again there has been little experience with
their use in administrative adjudications. Recommendation 4(a) is
110. Where the parties exchange the complete testimony of their witnesses prior to the
hearing, they naturally do not have to furnish narrative summaries also. The former procedure
more generously provides for discovery than does the latter and is in full compliance with
Recommendation 3(b).
111. If the witness' perception or observation of disputed facts is relevant, the deposition
should be allowed because in this case the narrative summary does not adequately replace an
oral examination for discovering the relevant facts. These instances should prove exceptional
because a witness' personal observation of past events is only rarely as crucial in administrative
adjudications as it is in personal injury and criminal cases.
112. The ABA Discovery Standards adopt a similar approach; they do not provide at all for
depositions in criminal trials but rely on the prosecutor's production of the prior statements of
the government's witnesses to afford the defendant adequate discovery of their expected
testimony. Standard 2.1, ABA DiscoveRY STANDARDS 52-53.
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premised on the fact that interrogatories to parties are an inexpensive
discovery tool which should be available in adjudicatory proceedings
before administrative agencies. Depositions are often not a reasonable
alternative because of the expense involved. In addition,
Recommendation 6 on the Production of Documents and Tangible
Things requires the party who is seeking discovery to be fairly specific
about the documents and things he wants. Interrogatories provide a
much needed vehicle for inquiry about the existence and location of
these documents and other relevant evidence.
Although a party seeking to take a deposition under
Recommendation 2 must first apply to the presiding officer for an
order to do so, Recommendation 4(a) does not place this limitation on
the serving of interrogatories, primarily because the serving of
interrogatories is a far simpler matter than the taking of a deposition.
In addition, interrogatories affect only the parties to the proceedings;
depositions generally involve non-parties. Because of this, the need for
the presiding officer to retain firm control over their use is not as great
for interrogatories as it is for depositions. Parties should therefore be
able to serve interrogatories on each other without applying to the
presiding officer for permission to do so. Further, in many simple
cases the answers to the interrogatories may supply the parties with
sufficient information to make a prehearing conference unnecessary.
However, interrogatories may often require comprehensive and
detailed responses which impose a real burden on the answering party.
In such cases, the prehearing conference may provide a less onerous
means for the parties to exchange information. The exchange of cases
between the parties at the prehearing conference may supply much of
the information sought by detailed or complex interrogatories.
Furthermore, the presiding officer at the prehearing conference can
arrange a mutual exchange, while the party answering interrogatories
must disclose his case without the assurance of reciprocity.
Recommendation 4(a) recognizes these problems and meets them
by providing that a party upon whom interrogatories have been served
may postpone answering them by asking the presiding officer to hold
a prehearing conference for the mutual exchange of evidentiary
exhibits and other information. The presiding officer should normally
grant the application if he has not yet held such a prehearing
conference under Recommendation 1. Even if there has been such a
prehearing conference, the presiding officer should hold additional
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ones if the parties are encountering difficulties in completing the
exchange of information on their cases. The presiding officer should
conduct the conference to insure that the interrogating party obtains
as much as possible of the requested information. Following the
completion of the conference, the party served with the interrogatories
must respond to all appropriate questions which have not yet been
answered. Of course, the presiding officer need not grant a party's
application for a prehearing conference if he has already held one and
the parties have exchanged their cases. In these instances, the party
'served with interrogatories must answer them if the questions call for
additional, relevant, and unprivileged information.
Interrogatories Directed to the Agency. Recommendation 4(a)
provides that a party to a proceeding may direct interrogatories to
"any other party." Since the agency or its staff is normally a party to
adjudicatory proceedings, in that capacity it should stand on the same
footing as any other party and be required to answer interrogatories
as any other party would; this is the specific intent of the
recommendation. Recommendation 4(b) handles the mechanics of
interrogatories directed to an agency; it requires each agency to
designate an agency "official on whom other parties to a proceeding
may serve written interrogatories directed to the agency." That
person then has responsibility for insuring that the appropriate agency
personnel with knowledge of the facts answer and sign the
interrogatories on behalf of the agency. 13 The answers to the
interrogatories bind the agency in the same manner as the attorney
representing the agency at the hearing binds it by signing pleadings,
stipulating facts, or speaking in an open hearing. Recommendation
4(b) recognizes this important role of the agency attorney by
authorizing him to make and sign objections to the interrogatories.
The agency attorney may, of course, also pass on the' accuracy and
appropriateness of the answers to interrogatories furnished by other
agency employees.
In the great majority of cases the information sought by
interrogatories directed to the agency can be supplied by the agency
staff; the agency employees with knowledge of the facts simply answer
the interrogatories on behalf of the agency. Only in unusual cases will
113. FCC rule 1.311(b)(2) presently contains a provision of this type: "Interrogatories
shall be served on the appropriate Bureau Chief (see § 1.21(b)). They will be answered and
signed by those personnel with knowledge of the facts. The answers will be served by the
Secretary of the Commission upon parties to the proceeding." 47 C.F.R. § 1.311 (b)(2) (1970).
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an agency head or member, whose primary function is to judge, have
relevant, unprivileged information not known to any other agency
employee. The last sentence in Recommendation 4(b) deals with this
unusual situation. Since it is inappropriate to authorize the presiding
officer to order agency members to supply discovery, he may not
order an agency head or member to answer an interrogatory; the
party seeking the answer must obtain a special order from the agency
itself. That order must be based on a finding that the interrogatory
"'seeks significant, unprivileged information not discoverable by
alternative means.""' This procedure safeguards the integrity of the
judicial function performed by the agency members but still allows
discovery from an agency head or member in cases of absolute
necessity.
Agencies have generally opposed subjecting their staffs to
interrogatories. The usual bases for the opposition are the burden
which interrogatories would impose on the agency staff and each
agency's desire to protect from disclosure its internal investigatory
and decisional processes."' The latter objection really pertains only to
the scope of this form of discovery and not to its existence, and to that
extent the objection is valid. Agency personnel should not be
questioned concerning their thought processes, their subjective
impressions, or their interoffice discussions and recommendations; to
require disclosure of these matters would subvert the freedom of
deliberation essential to fair administration and prevent open, frank
discussions between staff members concerning administrative
action."' Such matters should be treated as privileged in order to
protect the agency's efficient functioning. This privilege, however,
should not prevent the questioning of agency personnel about their
knowledge of the facts, the existence and location of documents, or
other relevant evidence. While Recommendation 4 does not specify in
detail the appropriate scope for interrogatories directed to the agency,
it does refer to agency personnel with "knowledge of the facts." An
agency, therefore, remains free under this recommendation to limit
the appropriate scope of written interrogatories to exclude purely
114. Recommendation 2(6) uses the same standard for determining whether agency
employees may be deposed. That recommendation, which does not contemplate the deposing of
agency heads, permits the presiding officer to enter a special order requiring agency personnel to
be deposed if this standard is met, but makes the order subject to an interlocutory appeal.
115. See, e.g., Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 939 (Ct. Cl.
1958) (Justice Reed).
116. Id. at 945-46.
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internal matters from discovery." 7 This protection is not limited to the
agency but extends to private parties as well. Interrogatories that are
thus properly limited in scope should not impose an undue burden on
the agency staff.
DISCOVERY RECOMMENDATION 5: REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS
A small number of agencies have adopted a rule on Requests for
Admissions similar to Rule 36 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure."' Recommendation 5 provides that a rule of this type
should be part of the discovery machinery of every agency. In all
probability, however, such a rule will play a modest role in the overall
scheme of discovery. Although the FTC has had such a rule"' for nine
years, it has been used very little because parties find it more
advantageous to stipulate to facts and to the admissiblity of evidence
at a prehearing conference where the examiner presides over the
mutual give and take. A written request for admission is a more
cumbersome device and counsel for both sides have a tendency toward
drafting technical, unhelpful responses. Nevertheless, a rule on
requests for admissions is a standard discovery provision which
should prove useful in many simple cases where no prehearing
conference is necessary and in more complex cases where it is wasteful
to call additional prehearing conferences merely because a party is
interested in obtaining an admission. Recommendation 5(b) also
contains special provisions on requests directed to the agency similar
to those in Recommendation 4(b) on interrogatories directed to the
agency. 20
DISCOVERY RECOMMENDATION 6: PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS AND
TANGIBLE THINGS
Agencies normally have broad investigatory powers to gather by
compulsory process or voluntary cooperation all the documents and
other tangible evidence they need. Judicial decisions have broadly
117. See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 1.311(b) (1970) (FCC). This rule would be valid under
Recommendation 4. This power of limitation is implicit in Recommendation 4 since normally a
party's work product and decisional processes are protected from discovery under Hickman v.
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
118. E.g., 16 C.F.R. § 3.31 (1970) (FTC); 46 C.F.R. § 502.208 (1970) (FMC); 47 C.F.R.
§ 1.246 (1970) (FCC).
119. 16C.F.R. § 3.31 (1970).
120. See notes 113-17 supra and accompanying text.
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sanctioned agency use of compulsory process in investigations of this
type conducted by the agency staff. 21 Private parties to agency
adjudications have no comparable investigatory machinery available
to obtain such information and must rely on discovery if they are to
be prepared fully prior to the hearing. At the discovery stage of the
proceeding the respondent or other private party should therefore be
able to inspect and obtain copies of all relevant, nonprivileged
documents and tangible things. Such documents and things may
either be in the possession of non-parties or of other parties to the
proceeding, including the agency itself.
Recommendation 6(a) deals with items in the possession of non-
parties by allowing a party to the proceeding to obtain a subpoena
duces tecum directed to the non-party. This subpoena is r6turnable
"at a prehearing conference, at the taking of the non-party's
deposition, or at any other specific time and place designated by the
issuing officer." Discovery between parties is covered by
Recommendation 6(b). That recommendation resembles rule 34 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure'2 and authorizes the presiding
officer to order a party to produce at "a prehearing conference or
other specific time and place" designated documents and tangible
things. These two provisions thus recognize that in administrative
adjudications different procedures are suitable for discovery of
documents and tangible things from non-parties than for similar
discovery between parties. Recommendation 6(c) further recognizes
that practical considerations dictate treating an agency that conducts
an adjudicatory proceeding as a party to that proceeding regardless of
whether the agency staff formally participates as a party.
These differences in procedure between Recommendations 6(a)
and 6(b) should not obscure the basic point that the advantages of
prehearing discovery of documents and tangible things are the same in
both situations: the parties are able to obtain complete information
ofn the relevant facts prior to the hearing. Private parties to
adjudicatory proceedings are also able to prepare their cases using the
broad investigatory powers possessed by the agencies. This form of
prehearing discovery should also serve to expedite the hearing. Under
current rules,'z a party may secure production of the desired items at
121. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960); Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327
U.S. 186 (1946).
122. Recommendation 6 resembles Rule 34 before it was amended on July 1, 1970. See note
5 supra.
123. E.g., 14 C.F.R. § 13.57(a) (1969) (FAA); 17 C.F.R. § 201.14(b) (1970) (SEC); 29
C.F.R. § 102.31(a) (1970) (NLRB).
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the hearing itself by serving subpoenas on the person who has
possession or control of them. Since this is usually the first time the
party has seen these items, the usual result is a delay in the hearing.
Much of the subpoenaed material may not even be put into evidence'
even though it is almost surely admissible 25 and may be significant.
The problem can be avoided if the items are available to all parties
prior to the hearing. Informal exchanges between counsel already
accomplish this purpose in many cases; Recommendation 6 simply
insures that this will occur.
Both Recommendations 6(a) and 6(b) cover the production of
"documents and tangible things." This phrase is used instead of the
more extensive catalogue of items in rule 34 of the Federal Rules
because it is both simple and comprehensive. There is no intent,
however, to adopt a narrower scope for Recommendations 6(a) and
6(b) than that of the Federal Rules or to prevent individual agencies
from itemizing in their own rules specific types of documents and
things. A complicating factor at this point is that the statute
authorizing the agency to issue subpoenas may be drawn only in terms
of subpoenas for the production of "documentary evidence."'26
Whether this type of statute limits the power of an agency to issue
subpoenas for tangible evidence other than documents is unclear . 2
Recommendation 6 does not attempt to resolve the theoretical
problem of the type of evidence which is subject by statute to the
compulsory process of an agency; instead, it selects the comprehensive
phrase "documents and tangible things," as best describing the
material which a party should be able to obtain through discovery.
Discovery Recommendation 6(a). The principal effect of this
124. See the testimony of Admiral Harllee, then Chairman of the Federal Maritime
Commission, before the House Subcommittee on Merchant Marine, in support of Public Law
90-177 (authorizing the Commission to enact discovery rules in complaint cases). Hearings on
H.R. 4231, S. 706, H.R. 4329, H.R. 9473 Before the Subcomm. on Merchant Marine of the
House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 60 (1967).
125. Since the criteria for requiring production and admitting into evidence are so
similar-relevance, lack of privilege, etc.-anything that can be produced is almost certainly
admissible.
126. See, e.g., FTC Act § 9, 15 U.S.C. § 49 (1964).
127. While the FTC has statutory power to issue subpoenas for "documentary evidence,"
§ 49 id., the FTC Rules of Practice authorize subpoenas for the production of "specificd
documents, papers, books, or other physical exhibits." 16 C.F.R. § 3.34(b)(1) (1970) (emphasis
added). The SEC has statutory authority to issue subpoenas for the production of "books,
papers or other documents," 15 U.S.C. § 77(s)(b) (1964), while its rules authorize subpoenas
"requiring the production of documentary or other tangible evidence." 17 C.F.R. § 201.14(b)
(1970) (emphasis added).
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recommendation is to make the subpoena duces tecum available to
private parties as a discovery device. The current practice of many
agencies is to make these subpoenas returnable only at the hearing
itself.128 Recommendation 6(a), however, permits parties to obtain
relevant, unprivileged documents and tangible things at an early stage
in the proceeding prior to the hearing and to use them in preparation
for the hearing. Under this recommendation, a party can also avoid
the possible surprise upon seeing a document for the first time at the
hearing by securing a subpoena returnable at a prehearing conference
or at the taking of a deposition. The return of subpoenaed documents
at a prehearing conference seems particularly desirable because the
parties can arrange at that time for the making of copies and for
stipulations on authenticity. This use of the prehearing conference is a
sensible way to handle instances where a party wants to obtain
documents for discovery purposes but is not interested in deposing
their possessor. In such cases it is less time consuming and
cumbersome to arrange for the production of the documents at a
prehearing conference than to schedule a deposition.' If there is no
formal prehearing conference, the return of subpoenaed documents
may be just as conveniently arranged at the presiding officer's office.
Of course, nothing in Recommendation 6(a) prevents the informal
return of subpoenaed documents directly to private counsel.
Discovery of documents and tangible things from non-parties
should not pose serious difficulties in most agency adjudications.
Only in a limited number of instances will a party to a proceeding
want to obtain large quantities of documents from non-parties, and
normally non-parties will not object to producing the documents at
the discovery stage rather than at the hearing itself.30 If non-parties
do object, the presiding officer may alleviate the problem if at the
prehearing conference he successfully narrows the issues or obtains
'128. See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 47.34 (1970); 9 C.F.R. § 202.13 (1970) (Dept. of Agriculture
disciplinary proceedings); 14 C.F.R. § 302.19(a) (1970) (CAB). Some agencies allow return at
the prehearing stage. 16 C.F.R. § 3.34(b)(1) (1970) (FTC-prehearing conference or
deposition); 47 C.F.R. § 1.333(e) (1970) (FCC-deposition).
129. Kintner, Recent Changes in Federal Trade Commission Discovery Practice, 37
AlNITRusT L.J. 238, 24142 (1968).
130. Restraint of trade cases at the FTC are a major exception. Respondents in these cases
often seek large quantities of documents on sales and market shares from their competitors, who
are generally not parties to the proceeding. The competitors will usually apply for protective
orders against disclosing what they believe is confidential business information. Serious delays
may result, but it is still important that respondents obtain adequate discovery. See Project,
Federal Administrative Law Developments-1970, 1971 DuKa L.J. 251.
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stipulations so as to make much of the requested discovery
unnecessary. An alternative solution to this problem is to delay the
respondent's discovery until an interval in the hearing between the
presentation of the agency's case and that of the respondent.," This
solution is premised on the fact that the respondent's need for
discovery will be much less at this point because he will know what he
must defend against. This proposed return to a trial by intervals is
unsound because of the difficulty in separating the agency's case from
the respondent's defense. The respondent needs full discovery in order
to cross-examine the agency's witnesses effectively and challenge its
documentary evidence. Furthermore, under Recommendation 1, the
agency should normally disclose its affirmative case at the prehearing
conference; this disclosure should enable the respondent and the
presiding officer to determine what further discovery is necessary.
Accordingly, Recommendation 6(a) does not provide for postponing
discovery of documents and tangible things from non-parties until
after the presentation of the agency's case.
Availability to Private Parties of Subpoenas Duces Tecum.
Recommendation 6(a) provides that private parties should be able to
obtain subpoenas duces tecum to enforce discovery requests directed
to non-parties. This aspect of the recommendation raises the question
of the appropriate procedure for making available to private parties
the compulsory process of the agency.3 2 Agencies which have the
subpoena power have adopted one of three basic approaches. The
usual approach is to require the party seeking the subpoenas to show
the "general relevance and reasonable scope of the evidence
131. A number of FTC hearing examiners have adopted this practice in restraint of trade
cases when competitors of the respondent have objected to producing what they believe to be
confidential information.
132. The APA has two provisions on the issuance of subpoenas by administrative agencies:
section 6(c), 5 U.S.C. § 555(d) (Supp. V, 1970), generally provides for the issuance of
subpoenas at the request of private parties; section 7(b)(2), 5 U.S.C. § 556(c)(2) (Supp. V,
1970), specifies the power of the presiding officer to issue subpoenas in a rule-making or
adjudicatory proceeding subject to sections 7 and 8. Both of the provisions, however, first
require that the issuance of subpoenas be otherwise "authorized by law." Congress must
therefore delegate to individual agencies the power to issue subpoenas; once Congress has done
so, section 7(b)(2) automatically vests subpoena power in the presiding officer in a rule-making
or adjudicatory proceeding to the extent that such power has been given to the agency itself,
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 74 (1947).
Similarly, once Congress has authorized the agency to issue subpoenas, section 6(c) operates so
that private parties to agency proceedings have the same access to subpoenas as do the
representatives of the agency. SENATE REPORT ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, S.
Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 206, 265 (1946).
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sought."' A second approach, adopted by only a small minority of
agencies, is to issue subpoenas to parties upon request; questions of
relevance and reasonable scope are only considered when the
subpoenaed person moves to quash the subpoena.'l The third, middle
approach grants the presiding officer discretion to require a showing
of general relevance and reasonable scope where the requested
subpoenas appear to be unreasonable in scope.3
In choosing between these approaches there are a number of
arguments to consider. On the one hand, judicial subpoenas are
available on request and there is no reason to differentiate between
judicial and administrative policy on the issuance of subpoenas.
Further, subpoenas should be available on request because it is unfair
to require a party to disclose to his adversaries the evidence he hopes
to obtain by subpoena. 13 On the other hand, administrative process,
unlike most judicial process, runs nationwide and is therefore much
more subject to the danger of abusive, unreasonable requests for
subpoenas. In addition, agency rules on the issuance of subpoenas
either explicitly provide for ex parte applications or contain no
requirement that the party seeking a subpoena give notice to the other
parties. Thus, any disclosure which a party must make to show the
general relevance and reasonable scope of the evidence sought by
subpoena is made only to the impartial presiding officer and not to the
party's adversaries.
In balancing these considerations, it does not seem desirable to
allow private parties to obtain subpoenas on request. Perhaps the best
approach is the middle one granting the presiding officer discretion to
require a showing of general relevance and reasonable scope. 137 This
133. See, e.g., 14 C.F.R. § 302.19(c) (1970) (CAB); 16 C.F.R. § 3.34(b)(1) (1970) (FTC);
18 C.F.R. § 1.23(a) (1970) (FPC); 47 C.F.R. § 1.333(c) (1970) (FCC); 49 C.F.R. § 1100.56(a)
(1970) (ICC). Section 6(d) of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 555(d) (Supp. V, 1970), expressly authorizes
agencies to adopt rules of procedure requiring such a showing.
• 134. The NLRB is the only major regulatory agency which has explicitly adopted this
policy. See 29 C.F.R. § 102.31 (1970). See also General Eng'r, Inc. v. NLRB, 341 F.2d 367,
375 n.15 (9th Cir. 1965).
135. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 201.14(b)(1) (1970) (SEC); 46 C.F.R. § 502.131 (1970) (FMC).
136. The temporary Administrative Conference recommended in 1962 that agencies issue
subpoenas upon request to parties to adjudicatory proceedings, and defended its position on
exactly the grounds mentioned. Recommendation No. 13, S. Doc. No. 24, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
207, 217-18 (1963). However, the committee report in support of the recommendation relied
almost solely on the NLRB practice. See note 134 supra. This aspect of Recommendation No.
13 is questionable.
137. This approach also seems consistent with section 6(c) of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 555(d)
(Supp. V, 1970), which allows the agency to control the issuance of subpoenas but prevents it
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approach does not burden the party applying for subpoenas with
making a showing of relevance and scope in every case; only when the
presiding officer finds the request unreasonable or oppressive on its
face must the applicant make the required showing to obtain the
subpoena.' Recommendation 6(a), however, is not intended to take a
position on whether an agency should initially require a party seeking
a subpoena to show the general relevance and reasonable scope of the
evidence sought. The recommendation is solely designed to encourage
discovery in administrative adjudications and is not directly
concerned with whether an agency controls the issuance of its
compulsory process by requiring a showing of the general relevance
and reasonable scope of the evidence sought prior to the issuance of a
subpoena or by deferring such questions to a ruling on a motion to
quash.
Discovery Recommendation 6(b). Recommendation 6(b) provides
for discovery between parties of documents and tangible things. The
recommendation covers three distinct situations: a private party may
seek such discovery from another private party; the agency staff
participating in the proceeding as a party may seek such discovery
from a private party; and a private party may seek such discovery
from the agency. In all three situations the party seeking discovery
must apply to the presiding officer for a production order. The
application must designate the documents and things whose
production is requested. Copies of the application must be served on
the other party or parties to the proceeding, who should be given an
opportunity to notify the presiding officer of their objections to the
application. The presiding officer should then order the production of
the designated items at a prehearing conference or at some other
specific time and place "unless he finds that there is not good cause
for doing so." The effect of this last clause is to require that there be
from "requiring a detailed, unnecessary, and burdensome showing of evidence which might fall
into the hands of the party's adversaries. . . (who in any event should not have access to such
papers directly or indirectly)." SENATE REPORT ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT,
supra note 132, at 265.
138. Judicial decisions have recognized that even in the absence of a procedural rule
requiring a showing of general relevance and reasonable scope, agencies have an inherent power
to deny requests for subpoenas that seek irrelevant material or are unreasonable in scope. In San
Francisco Mining Exch. v. SEC, 378 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1967), the court upheld the SEC's
refusal to issue subpoenas duces tecum and ad testificandum directed to Commission members
on the ground that the evidence sought was irrelevant, even though the SEC rule in effect at the
time of the refusal appeared to make the issuance of subpoenas mandatory on request and did
not require any showing of the general relevance and reasonable scope of the evidence sought.
See also Independent Directory Corp. v. FTC, 188 F.2d 468, 471 (2d Cir. 195 1).
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"good cause" for the production of the designated documents and
tangible things but to place the burden of persuasion on the issue of
good cause on the party or parties opposing production and-not on the
applicant. Thus, the party seeking discovery need not "plead" good
cause in his application for a production order.
The procedure for obtaining a production order is similar to the
procedure in Recommendation 2(2)-(5) for obtaining an order to take
a deposition. These requirements, are intended to insure that the
presiding officer retains firm control over the discovery process. In a
number of ways this procedure differs from that under the new Rule
34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the Production of
Documents and Things. Rule 34 functions extrajudicially and
eliminates the requirement of "good cause. ' 13  Similarly,
Recommendation 6(a) does not require notice to the other parties or a
showing of good cause for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum
directed to a non-party.
These differences between Recommendations 6(a) and 6(b) should
on the whole make it somewhat easier for a party to obtain a
subpoena directed to a non-party than to obtain a production order
directed to another party. This divergent treatment recognizes that the
three situations covered by Recommendation 6(b) pose significantly
different problems than does the discovery of documents and tangible
things from non-parties covered by Recommendation 6(a). Where
discovery between parties is involved, the presiding officer must
maintain firmer control over the discovery process to prevent delays
and other abuses. The quantity of material which a party to the
proceeding seeks from a fellow party is likely to be greater than that
sought from individual non-parties; claims that the material sought
deserves "work product" protection are likely to be more frequent
when discovery is sought from another party. The presiding officer in
these situations should protect parties from abusive production
re'quests and resolve all questions of privilege. Even more important,
the parties to the proceeding should participate with the presiding
officer in formulating a prehearing procedure designed to facilitate the
exchange of information. The presiding officer should insure that
production applications do not interfere with the smooth functioning
of prehearing procedures and delay the course of the proceedings.
139. The party seeking production must still show good cause if he is seeking discovery of
trial preparation materials or of the opinions of experts under Rule 26(b).
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Again, while it is the intention of these recommendations that the
prehearing conference should be the primary discovery procedure, in
many simple cases mutual applications for production orders and the
resultant exchange of documents between the parties may obviate the
need for a formal prehearing conference. However, in more complex
cases, myriad requests for the production of documents may cause
confusion and delay, especially if the parties have not yet attended a
prehearing conference. The production order requested by one party
may have the effect of requiring another party to disclose his
evidentiary case prior to such disclosure by the applicant. In such
cases the presiding officer may well determine that there is no "good
cause" for ordering the one-sided disclosure of a party's case. The
presiding officer should instead take control of the proceeding and
schedule a prehearing conference where the parties will conduct a
mutual exchange of their affirmative evidentiary cases. Of course, a
party may wish to obtain discovery of documents and other tangible
things in addition to those which another party plans to make part of
its evidentiary case. At the close of the prehearing conference the
presiding officer can determine what further discovery of this type is
necessary and order the production of the documents and tangible
things in question.4 0 In most cases, the prehearing conference should
be the source from which all discovery flows and should be the
principal means by which the presiding officer can control the parties'
discovery.
Discovery Recommendation 6(c). In cases where a private party is
seeking discovery of documents and tangible things from the agency,
Recommendation 6(c) treats the agency conducting an adjudicatory
proceeding as a party to that proceeding whether or not the agency
140. A pattern similar to that described above has developed in complaint and investigation
proceedings at the FMC. These proceedings often involve large numbers of private
parties-individual carriers, conferences of carriers, shippers, and governmental agencies-and
masses of documentary evidence. The Commission's new discovery rules, 46 C.F.R. § 502.207
(1970), contain a provision for production orders closely modeled on rule 34 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure before it was revised. In applying this rule hearing examiners generally
postpone ordering a party to produce documents until there has been a prehearing conference;
normally this conference takes place at an early stage in the proceeding. At the conference the
parties are often able, with the guidance of the presiding officer, to arrange for the mutual
production of relevant material. Discovery then proceeds on a voluntary basis. Only rarely is it
necessary for the presiding officer to compel production through a formal order.
The Commission's Hearing Counsel, who is a party to all investigation proceedings, is often
the chief beneficiary of this expanded discovery between parties. He uses the examiner's
authority to order the production of relevant, unprivileged documents to gain access to the
records of the other parties to the proceeding.
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staff formally participates as a party. In the majority of adjudicatory
proceedings the appropriate division of the agency does so participate.
This is particularly true in disciplinary and enforcement cases.
However, agencies often adjudicate controversies between private
parties where the agency staff takes no position and does not intervene
as a party.' Private parties to such proceedings may need access to
documents and tangible things in the agency's possession whether or
not the agency staff chooses to become a party to the proceeding.
Agencies are adjudicating cases in their areas of regulatory
responsibility, and their files often contain information relevant to the
proceedings and useful to one or more of the private parties. A party's
ability to obtain production of these items in the agency's files should
not depend on the fortuitous circumstance of the agency staff joining
the proceeding as a party. On the other hand, an agency adjudicating
a controversy should never be treated as a non-party from whom a
party can obtain discovery under Recommendation 6(a) by simply
obtaining a subpoena duces tecum, particularly since the items sought
will probably not be routinely available to the public.
Recommendation 6(c) resolves this problem by treating the agency as
a party to all adjudications conducted by it and thus requiring a party
seeking discovery to obtain a production order under the procedures
suggested by Recommendation 6(b).12
Discovery Recommendations 6(b) and 6(c) and the Freedom of
Information A ct. Discovery of documents from agency files has been
greatly enhanced by the Freedom of Information Act of 1966
(FOIA).4 3 That Act requires agencies to make available to any person
upon request certain kinds of documents and identifiable agency
records. However, the Act contains nine categories of exemptions;
agency records falling within any one of these categories are not
subject to the disclosure and public information requirements of the
Act. "'44 While some agencies have expended considerable effort to
141. Comparative licensing hearings before the FCC where several applicants seek a single
license are an example. Even in these proceedings the agency staff may participate as a party if it
is interested in taking a position on a particular issue.
142. This practice is currently followed by at least three agencies. See 16 C.F.R. § 3.36
(1970) (FTC); 46 C.F.R. § 502.209 (1970) (FMC); 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.325 & 0.461(e)(1) (1970)
(FCC).
143. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. V, 1970).
144. The nine exemptions include: internal personnel rules, material specifically exempted
from disclosure by statute, trade secrets, financial information privileged or confidential, inter-
agency or intra-agency memorandums which would not be available in litigation with the
agency, personnel and medical files, investigatory files, and geological and geophysical
information. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (Supp. V, 1970).
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implement the Act and to foster a freer flow of administrative
materials," 5 the exact scope of a number of the exempted categories is
unclear, and the agencies have naturally tended to interpret the
exemptions broadly.14
The passage of the FOIA does not eliminate the need to provide
for discovery of documents and tangible things in agency files by a
private party to an adjudicatory proceeding. Strictly speaking, the
Act is independent of discovery in adjudicatory proceedings because it
provides that an agency shall make available upon the request of any
person identifiable records which do not fall within one of the specific
exemptions, as long as the request is made in accordance with
published agency rules establishing provisions on time, place, and
fees. 4 7 Thus, a person does not have to be a party to an agency
proceeding to take advantage of the FOIA. An inquisitive person who
has no interest in obtaining agency records other than satisfying his
own curiosity stands on the same footing under the Act as does the
respondent in an agency enforcement action. Certainly a private party
in an adjudicatory proceeding has a greater need to obtain agency
records than does the casual inquirer. In addition, private parties in
agency adjudications should be able to obtain discovery of documents
which fall within the exemptions of the FOIA and which are thus not
available to the public at large. 4 ' Fairness may require that an agency
145. Sky, Agency Implementation of the Freedom of Information A ct, 20 AD. L. REV. 445
(1968).
146. Davis, The Information Act: A Pieliminary Analysis, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 761 (1967).
For example, the scope of the exemption for "trade secrets and commercial or financial
information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential," 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4)
(Supp. V, 1970), is particularly uncertain. The Attorney General has taken the position that this
provision exempts non-commercial and non-financial information which is privileged or
received in confidence by the agency even though the plain words of the exemption seem to cover
only trade secrets and information that is "commercial or financial." ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
MEMORANDUM ON THE PUBLIC INFORMATION SECTION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
ACT 32 (1967). Dicta in recent court decisions have provided little clarification of the issue,
Compare Consumers Union, Inc. v. VA, 301 F. Supp. 796, 802 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), with
Barceloneta Shoe Corp. v. Compton, 271 F. Supp. 591,594 (D.P.R. 1967). Professor Davis has
suggested that a clarifying amendment is necessary to straighten out the tangle. Davis, supra, at
811.
147. Normally the request is to be directed to the Secretary or other administrative official
of the agency who has authority to rule on the request on behalf of the agency. If the request is
refused, the person seeking the records may bring an action in Federal District Court asking that
the agency be enjoined from withholding agency records and be ordered to produce any agency
records improperly withheld from the person bringing suit. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (Supp. V,
1970).
148. Adoption of Recommendation 6 may be particularly helpful in avoiding the FOIA
exemption covering "investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes except to the
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produce, upon the request of a private party in an adjudication,
records which the agency quite rightly and quite legally wants to keep
from the public at large. This is particularly true when third persons
who supplied the agency with information have an interest in keeping
the agency records confidential. 4 9 In such cases, protective orders
may be framed under Recommendation 8 which will allow the agency
to provide the respondent with adequate discovery while protecting
the interests of third persons from whom the agency obtained the
information. It should be clear, then, that the FOIA by itself is not
sufficient to allow adequate discovery by parties in a proceeding.
Recommendation 6 is therefore not meant to amend the FOIA but to
supplement it in order to accomplish the purposes of discovery.
Privileged Documents in Agency Files. Recommendation 6(b),
like all the other recommendations, only provides for the discovery of
relevant, unprivileged information and material. The agency may
therefore raise any recognized claim of privilege in response to a
extent available by law to a party other than an agency." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (Supp. V, 1970).
Investigatory files are often the most likely location of the documents which private parties want
the agency to produce, yet this exemption has been broadly construed to restrict the'amount of
information that must be produced. Clement Bros. v. NLRB, 282 F. Supp. 540 (N.D. Ga.
1968); Barceloneta Shoe Corp. v. Compton, 271 F. Supp. 591 (D.P.R. 1967). While it may be
sensible to restrict the general public's access to investigatory files to protect the confidentiality
and smooth functioning of the investigation, a private party in an adjudicatory proceeding has a
strong interest in obtaining relevant, unprivileged documents and tangible things in investigatory
files so that he can learn the basis for the case against him and prepare his defense. The statute
recognizes that there may be exceptions to the exemptions; the exemption for investigatory files
makes an exception for portions of those files that may be made "available by law to a party"
to an agency proceeding, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (Supp. V, 1970). Congress probably had only the
Jencks Act in mind when it mentioned investigatory files available "by law" to a party, see
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM ON THE PUBLIC INFORMATION SECTION OF THE
ADMINSTRATIvE PROCEDURE ACT 38 (1967), but surely an agency may make further exceptions
and grant individual parties access to investigatory files that are exempt from the public
disclosure requirements of the Act.
149. The FTC, for example, collects a great variety of economic data from businessmen
which the businessmen do not want to fall into the hands of their competitors. Often this data
becomes relevant to restraint of trade or deceptive practices proceedings brought against one of
those competitors. While the competitor-respondent is generally entitled to obtain discovery of
that data under the FTC's rules, 16 C.F.R. §§ 3.34, 3.36 (1970), the FTC has developed an
elaborate system of protective orders to insure that the respondent does not disclose the
confidential data or put it to his own advantage in some manner unconnected "with the
proceeding. Often discovery of the data is limited to respondent's outside counsel, who may not
share it with the respondent and must return it at the end of the proceeding. Crown Cork and
Seal Co., [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 17,828, at 23,201 (FTC 1967). For a
thorough discussion of the FTC practice, see E. Gellhorn, The Treatment of Confidential
Information by the Federal Trade Commission: Pretrial Practices, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 113
(1968).
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production request. Recommendation 6(b) does not attempt to define
the law of privilege but leaves it to the presiding officer and to the
courts on review to determine what agency records are privileged and
thus not subject to discovery. Applicable privileges would include the
attorney-client privilege, the informer's privilege, the protection
accorded "work product," the privilege for trade secrets and
comparable confidential data, and the executive privilege to withhold
military and diplomatic secrets and other information whose
disclosure would be detrimental to the public interest. 5 The scope of
these privileges, although by no means clear, must be left to a case-by-
case determination. The government's claim of privilege should not be
accepted without question; in each case the presiding officer and
reviewing court must scrutinize the claim to determine its validity.,"
Furthermore, since most privileges are not absolute, the presiding
officer and reviewing court must in each case balance competing
interests in reaching a decision on privilege. The Supreme Court
adopted this balancing approach in determining whether the
government in a criminal case must disclose the identity of an
informer:
We believe that no fixed rule with respect to disclosure is justifiable. The
problem is one that calls for balancing the public interest in protecting the flow
of information against the individual's right to prepare his defense. Whether a
proper balance renders nondisclosure erroneous must depend on the particular
circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the crime charged, the
possible defenses, the possible significance of the informer's testimony, and
other relevant factors. 52
A similar balancing of the agency's need to keep the material secret
with the private party's need for disclosure is also necessary in civil
and administrative proceedings.'
A privilege peculiar to administrative agencies is one that renders
inter-agency and intra-agency documents which reflect the
government's decisional and policy-making functions immune from
disclosure.'5 Normally this privilege has been designated as part of
150. See generally C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE, §§ 143-50 (1954); Carrow, Government
Nondisclosure in Judicial Proceedings, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 166 (1958).
151. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957) (informer's privilege); United States v.
Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953) (military secrets).
152. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 62 (1957).
153. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. City of Burlington, 351 F.2d 762, 769-70 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
(informer's privilege).
154. See, e.g., Ackerly v. Ley, 420 F.2d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B.
Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318 (D.D.C. 1966), affdper curiam sub. nom. Carl Zeiss Stiftung
v. Clark, 384 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 952 (1967).
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the executive privilege; it also serves as a corollary to the rule of
United States v. Morgan' that an executive or administrative officer
should not be examined concerning his mental and decisional
processes. The privilege is based on a recognition that frank
expression and discussion within the government would not be
possible if all deliberative communications were subject to outside
scrutiny.' 8 Once again Recommendation 6(b) makes no attempt to
delineate the boundaries of this privilege but leaves those
determinations to be made on a case-by-case basis.1 7 No doubt
difficult cases will arise, but there should be many other instances
where the presiding officer can readily determine that the documents
sought contain only information which is not privileged. Agency
production of these documents should enhance the fairness of
adjudicatory proceedings and alleviate the commonplace complaint of
lawyers practicing before administrative agencies that too much in
agency files is kept secret. The FOIA already broadly provides for
public disclosure of this type of material. The Act's fifth exemption
excludes from public disclosure only those "inter-agency or intra-
agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law
to a private party other than an agency in litigation with the
agency."'-" This provision was intended to make available to the
general public internal memorandums and correspondence "which
would routinely be disclosed to a private party through discovery
process in litigation with the agency."'5 The few judicial decisions on
this point have carried out this intent by interpreting the exemption
narrowly. Apparently an agency must produce internal
memorandums or letters which would be available to any party in any
litigation in which the agency having the records might become
involved. The test for "availability" is the discovery practice in the
federal courts; only privileged documents are exempt. 16° An agency
155. 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941).
156. See notes 115-16 supra and accompanying text.
157. Recent decisions have recognized that inter-agency and intra-agency documents that
contain factual information or observations are not privileged; the executive privilege only
covers the statements of informers and the deliberations and recommendations of agency
members of employees. Machin v. Zuckert, 316 F.2d 336 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Cooney v. Sun
Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 288 F. Supp. 708 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
158. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (Supp. V, 1970). See note 144 supra.
159. HousE COMM. REPORT ON THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATIOr ACT, H.R. REP. No. 1497,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1966).
160. GSA v. Benson, 415 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1969); Consumers Union of United States, Inc.
v. VA, 301 F. Supp. 796 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
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must, therefore, disclose to the general public a broad category of
internal documents regardless of whether it adopts formal discovery
rules.
Problems associated with interpreting the exemption of the FOIA
dealing with internal memorandums should not arise when a party to
an adjudicatory proceeding applies for a production order under
Recommendation 6(b). Under the recommendation, the presiding
officer should determine whether the internal agency documents
requested by the party are relevant and unprivileged. If they are, he
should order the agency to produce them unless he finds that for some
other reason the party does not have good cause for their production.
If the presiding officer determines that public disclosure of the
documents would be undesirable, he can arrange for a protective
order as provided for in Recommendation 8. The presiding officer is
particularly well suited to make these determinations because of his
thorough knowledge of the case.'
Since agency files are likely to contain large numbers of
documents obtained in confidence from private persons outside the
agency, the presiding officer must remember that there is a vast
difference
between confidential and privileged. Almost any communication, even an
ordinary letter, may be confidential . . . . But privileged means that the
contents are of such character that the law as a matter of public policy protects
them against disclosure. . . . That the documents are merely confidential does
not protect them against compulsory disclosure. Of course this does not mean
that such documents must be produced upon every demand; good cause for
intrusion into confidential files and materiality and relevancy must be shown.
6 2
Recommendation 6 therefore applies to documents in the agency's
files which have been obtained in confidence from third persons, as
long as they are not otherwise privileged and are relevant to the
proceeding for which they have been requested.6 3
161. The FCC has recognized this fact in providing by rule that a request under the FOIA
for identifiable agency records which is made by a party to a pending adjudicatory proceeding
should be ruled on by the presiding officer rather than by the FCC's Executive Director, as is the
usual practice. Compare 47 C.F.R. § 0.46(e) (1970), with id. § 0.461.
162. Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 254 F.2d 314, 321 (D.C. Cir.
1958).
163. The fact that confidential documents may be made public under Recommendation 6
should not cause the agencies any severe harm or difficulty in obtaining the information they
need to function properly. Agencies today generally have the power to issue investigatory
subpoenas; private persons cooperate with these agencies chiefly because they realize that if they
do not supply the information voluntarily the agency can obtain it by compulsory process. No
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There is one final problem on discovery from the agency of
documents obtained by the agency from third persons. At least one
agency requires that a respondent first attempt through voluntary
means and through the agency's discovery rules to obtain the
documents from the persons who supplied them to the agency before
obtaining discovery from the agency's confidential files. Only if the
documents are unavailable elsewhere may the respondent obtain them
from the agency. "4 To require a party to seek discovery from many
sources when the material is already collected by the agency and
compiled in one place is inefficient and burdensome. " s The public
interest is not served by delaying the prehearing process in this
manner. Since the respondent will eventually obtain any relevant,
unprivileged documents from one source or another, there seems to be
no valid reason why the agency should not supply them to him in the
first place.'66 Recommendation 6(b) rejects this aspect of agency
practice and requires the agency to produce any relevant, unprivileged
documents and tangible things in its possession or control. The
agency cannot force a party to first seek discovery from third persons
of documents which are in the agency's files. In the absence of a
recognized privilege, a party cannot resist the production of
documents on the grounds that he obtained the documents in
confidence from third persons.'6
DISCOVERY RECOMMENDATION 7: ROLE OF THE PRESIDING OFFICER
Recommendation 7(a) authorizes the presiding officer to impose
time limitations on discovery; Recommendation 7(b) restricts
doubt some agency informants would prefer that their contributions to agency files remain
hidden from view. Their concern may be met in great part through limiting discovery of this
material to parties to adjudicatory proceedings conducted by the agency and by framing
stringent protective orders in appropriate cases. Relevant evidence could be received at the
hearing in camera where necessary. On the other hand, many persons who supply information to
an agency are not particularly concerned with obtaining confidential treatment. Agencies too
often promise confidential treatment as a routine matter and stamp as confidential material that
need not be so classified.
164. Crown Cork & Seal Co., FTC Docket No. 8687 (Interlocutory Order, Feb. 8, 1967)
(unreported).
165. E. Gellhorn, supra note 149, at 163-64.
166. The interests of third parties can be protected, if necessary, by requiring that they be
given notice that a party is seeking production of their documents. This allows the third party to
seek a protective order when necessary without being directly involved in the discovery process.
Id at 165.
167. See FTC v. Tuttle, 244 F.2d 605, 611-12 (2d Cir. 1957) (FTC investigatory subpoena
directed to trade association).
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interlocutory appeals from the presiding officer's rulings on
discovery. These provisions recognize the vital role played by the
presiding officer at the discovery stage of the proceeding. He must
exercise firm control over the discovery process if the parties are to
obtain adequate discovery without unduly delaying the course of the
proceeding. Of course, the parties will often be able to agree among
themselves on the timing and scope of discovery. Recommendation
7(a) does not prohibit such agreements but recognizes that they will
not always be possible. In such cases the presiding officer must have
the power to resolve disputes. Under these Discovery
Recommendations the presiding officer should assume responsibility
fot the satisfactory functioning of the discovery process. He should be
prepared to intervene if discovery is taking too long or if the parties
are wandering too far afiela. Recommendation 7, in conjunction with
the other recommendations, gives the presiding officer adequate
authority to assert this control whenever necessary. Under
Recommendation 7(b) the presiding officer may prevent interlocutory
appeals from his rulings on discovery except in those unusual
situations where he orders the deposing of an agency employee under
Recommendation 2(6).
DISCOVERY RECOMMENDATIONS 8: ORDERS
Protective orders are an essential part of any system of discovery;
Recommendation 8 accordingly authorizes the presiding officer to
formulate appropriate protective orders. Its provisions do not break
any new ground but closely follow the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the ABA's suggested Standards for criminal trials.
Recommendation 8(a) is derived largely from rule 26(c) of the Federal
Rules. The variety of protective orders outlined should prove adequate
for administrative adjudications. Subdivision 8(a)(7) should prove
especially useful by allowing agencies to limit disclosure of sensitive
information to a party's outside counsel or to other designated
persons. 6' Recommendations 8(b) and 8(c), on the other hand, derive
from Standards 4.4 and 4.6, respectively, of the ABA's suggested
standards for criminal trials.'69 Recommendation 8(b) authorizes the
presiding officer to enter protective orders restricting or deferring the
disclosure of the names of witnesses, while Recommendation 8(c)
authorizes the presiding officer to hold in camera proceedings on the
168. See note 149 supra.
169. ABA DiSCOVERY STANDARDS 18-19.
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issuance of protective orders. The latter provision seems non-
controversial because cases frequently arise where requiring a party to
make the necessary showing of good cause in a public hearing would
defeat the purpose of a protective order. The former provision is
essential because in a minority of proceedings there is a real danger
that a witness whose name is disclosed prior to the hearing will be
subject to intimidation, harrassment, or other forms of pressure or
influence. 70 The general provisions on protective orders in
Recommendation 8(a) do not specifically treat this problem because
those provisions derive from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
which do not expressly authorize the pre-trial discovery of witness
lists. Recommendations I and 3, however, require the parties to
disclose their witness lists prior to the hearing; this requirement
creates a need for a special provision on protective orders in such
situations. Recommendation 8(b) therefore gives the presiding officer
the power to protect a witness by restricting or defering disclosure by
a party of the witness' name. The presiding officer may also restrict or
defer production of the narrative summary of the expected testimony
of a witness and the production by the agency of a prior statement of
an agency witness. These additional provisions coordinate
Recommendation 8(b) with Recommendation 3 and are expected to
give the presiding officer sufficient authority to protect a witness
whenever necessary.
DISCOVERY RECOMMENDATION 9: SUBPOENAS
The effective functioning of discovery procedures depends on the
authority of the presiding officer to enforce discovery requests
through the issuance of subpoenas. Recommendation 9 accordingly
provides that the presiding officer should have authority to issue
subpoenas ad testificandum and duces tecum at any time during the
course of the proceeding.17' Under section 7(b)(2) of the APA,'72 any
authority which the agency has to issue subpoenas automatically vests
in an officer presiding at a hearing covered by that section. The great
majority of agencies which conduct adjudicatory proceedings already
170. See notes 49-61 supra and accompanying text.
171. Currently, the exclusive route for enforcement of an administrative subpoena is by
agency application for a judicial order of compliance which can in turn be enforced by the
court's power of contempt.
172. 5 U.S.C. § 556(c)(2) (Supp. V, 1970).
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have statutory authority to issue subpoenas;7 3 those few agencies
which do not must obtain it from Congress.' 74 Many of the
adjudicatory proceedings conducted by agencies without subpoena
power are not subject to sections 5, 7, and 8 of the APA and therefore
are not directly affected by Recommendation 9. However, if the
proceeding is within the scope of these recommendations, the
presiding officer should have the power to issue subpoenas. 7 -5
CONCLUSION
Nine years ago the Administrative Conference generally
recommended that administrative agencies adopt rules of discovery
for their adjudicatory proceedings. The premises of the
recommendation were that fairness to private parties, administrative
efficiency, and the public interest required adequate and full discovery
by all parties to the proceeding. Faced with a less than unanimous
response in the period since the original recommendation, the
Conference last year adopted a detailed and comprehensive set of
minimum standards for discovery in adjudicatory proceedings subject
to sections 5, 7, and 8 of the APA. The premises of this
recommendation were the same as those of the earlier one. Hopefully,
this recommendation will meet with greater success than the first one,
so that it will be unnecessary to issue still another recommendation
nine years hence.
173. The principal agencies that do not presently have the subpoena power for certain of
their adjudicatory proceedings are the FDA, the Post Office Department, HEW (in proceedings
under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1964)), the Civil Service
Commission, and most contract appeal boards.
174. Recommendation 13(l)(1) of the temporary Administrative Conference went further
than this and provided that "[o]fficers presiding at adjudicatory hearings should have the
authority to issue subpoenas requiring the attendance of witnesses or the production of evidence,
whether or not the proceedings are governed by sections 7 and 8 of the Administrative Procedure
Act." Recommendation No. 13, S. Doc. No. 24, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. 209, 219 (1963). The
coverage of that recommendation is broader than that of Recommendation 9 because all of the
present discovery recommendations are limited to adjudicatory proceedings subject to section 5,
7, and 8 of the APA. The narrower coverage of Recommendation 9 does not reflect, however,
any intent to reject or depart from the broader recommendation of the temporary Conference.
175. There are also a handful of little known proceedings scattered through the federal
establishment where the agency lacks the power to issue subpoenas. Sometimes the absence of
subpoenas has not proved to be a serious problem because all the relevant evidence is a matter of
public record or is in reports filed by the respondent with the agency. An example of this type of
proceeding is the revocation of the license of a customshouse broker by the Department of the
Treasury. See 19 C.F.R. §§ 31.51-.80 (1970). This situation is atypical; the general rule is still
that the presiding officer should have the authority to issue subpoenas.
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APPENDIX
RECOMMENDATION 21: DISCOVERY IN AGENCY ADJUDICATION
(As Approved by the Administrative Conference at its Plenary Session, June 3, 1970).
Prehearing discovery in agency adjudication insures that the parties to the
proceeding have access to all relevant, unprivileged information prior to the hearing.
Its primary objectives include the more expeditious conduct of the hearing itself, the
encouragement of settlement between the parties, and greater fairness in adjudication.
Agencies that conduct adjudicatory proceedings generally enjoy broad investigatory
powers, and fairness requires that private parties have equal access to all relevant,
unprivileged information at some point prior to the hearing.
RECOMMENDATION
It is therefore recommended that each agency recognize the following minimum
standards for discovery in adjudicatory proceedings subject to sections 5, 7 and 8 of
the Administrative Procedure Act, now codified as 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556 and 557.
Individual agencies may permit additional discovery where appropriate and may
tailor the recommended standards to meet the needs of particular types of proceedings
where special or less elaborate discovery procedures will accomplish the same basic
objectives or where the protective measures here recommended will be inadequate to
achieve the ends sought. Each agency should undertake to train its hearing examiners
in the application of the rules it promulgates to implement these standards. This
training should draw upon the experience of other agencies, the Federal Courts,
private practitioners, and bar associations.
The recommended minimum standards include the following procedures:
1. Prehearing Conferences
The presiding officer should have the authority to hold one or more prehearing
conferences during the course of the proceeding on his own motion or at the request of
a party to the proceeding. The presiding officer should normally hold at least one
prehearing conference in proceedings where the issues are complex or whereit appears
likely that the hearing will last a considerable period of time. The presiding officer at
a prehearing conference should have the authority to direct the parties to exchange
their evidentiary exhibits and witness lists prior to the hearing. Where good cause
exists, the parties should have the right at any time to amend, by deletion or
supplementation, their evidentiary exhibits and witness lists.
2. Depositions
A party to the proceeding should be able to take depositions of witnesses upon
oral examination or written questions for purposes of discovering relevant,
unprivileged information, subject to the following conditions:
(1) the taking of depositions should normally be deferred until there has
been at least one prehearing conference;
(2) the party seeking to take a deposition should apply to the presiding
officer for an order to do so;
(3) the party seeking to take a deposition should serve copies of the
application on the other party or parties to the proceedings, who should be
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given an opportunity, along with the deponent, to notify the presiding officer of
any objections to the taking of the deposition;
(4) the presiding officer should not grant an application to take a
deposition if he finds that the taking of the deposition would result in undue
delay;
(5) the presiding officer should otherwise grant an application to take a
deposition unless he finds that there is not good cause for doing so; and
(6) the deposing of an agency employee should only be allowed upon an
order of the presiding officer based on a specific finding that the party applying
to take the deposition is seeking significant, unprivileged information not
discoverable by alternative means. Any such order should be subject to an
interlocutory appeal to the agency.




At the prehearing conference or at some other reasonable time prior to the hearing
the attorney or employee appearing on behalf of the agency in the proceeding should
make available to the other parties to the proceeding any prior statements of agency
witnesses which are in the possession of the agency or obtainable by it from any other
Federal agency and which relate to the subject matter of the expected testimony.
"Statement" is defined to include only a written statement signed or adopted by the
witness or a recording or transcription which is a substantially verbatim recital of an
oral statement made by the witness to an agent of the Federal government.
(b) Narrative Summaries of Expected Testimony
At the prehearing conference or at some other reasonable time prior to the hearing
each party to the proceeding should make available to the other parties to the
proceeding the names of the witnesses he expects to call and a narrative summary of
their expected testimony. The attorney or employee appearing on behalf of the agency
in the proceeding should have the authority to designate any prior statement or
statements of an agency witness which he makes available to the other parties under
Recommendation 3(a) as all or part of the narrative summary of that witness's
expected testimony. Where good cause exists, the parties should have the right at any
time to amend, by deletion or supplementation, the list of names of the witnesses they
plan to call and the narrative summaries of the expected testimony of those witnesses.
4. Written Interrogatories to Parties
(a) A vailability
A party to the proceeding should be able to serve written interrogatories upon any
other party for purposes of discovering relevant, .privileged information. A party
served with interrogatories should be able, before he must answer the interrogatories,
to apply to the presiding officer for the holding of a prehearing conference for the
mutual exchange of evidentiary exhibits and other information. Each interrogatory
which requests information not previously supplied at a prehearing conference should
be answered separately and fully in writing under oath, unless it is objected to, in
which event the reasons for the objection should be stated in lieu of an answer. The
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party upon whom the interrogatories have been served should serve a copy of the
answers and objections within a reasonable time upon the party submitting the
interrogatories. The party submitting the interrogatories may move the presiding
officer for an order compelling an answer to an interrogatory or interrogatories to
which there has been an objection or other failure to answer.
(b) Interrogatories Directed to the Agency
Each agency should designate an appropriate official on whom other parties to the
proceeding may serve written interrogatories directed to the agency. That official
should arrange for agency personnel with knowledge of the facts to answer and sign
the interrogatories on behalf of the agency. The attorney or employee appearing on
behalf of the agency in the proceeding should have the authority to make and sign
objections to interrogatories served upon the agency. Interrogatories directed to the
agency which seek information available only from the agency head, member or
members should only be allowed upon an order of the agency-based on a specific
finding that the interrogating party is seeking significant, unprivileged information
not discoverable by alternative means.
5. Requests for Admissions
(a) Availability
A party to the proceeding should be able to serve upon any other party a written
request for the admission, for purposes of the pending proceeding, of any relevant,
unprivileged facts, including the genuineness of any document described in the
request.
(b) Requests Directed to the Agency
Each agency should designate an appropriate official on whom other parties to the
proceeding may serve requests for admissions directed to the agency. That official
should arrange for agency personnel with knowledge of the facts to respond to the
requests on behalf of the agency. The attorney or employee appearing on behalf of the
agency in the proceeding should have the authority to make and sign objections to
requests for admissions served upon the agency. Requests directed to the agency
which seek admissions obtainable only from the agency head, member, or members
should only be allowed upon an order of the agency based on a specific finding that
the requesting party is seeking significant, unprivileged information not discoverable
by alternative means.
6. Production of Documents and Tangible Things
(a) From Non-Parties
A party to the proceeding should be able to obtain in accordance with agency
rules a subpoena duces tecum requiring a non-party to produce relevant designated
documents and tangible things, not privileged, at a prehearing conference, at the
taking of the non-party's deposition, or at any other specific time and place
designated by the issuing officer.
(b) From Parties
A party to the proceeding should be able to apply to the presiding officer for an
order requiring any other party to produce and to make available for inspection,
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copying or photographing, at a prehearing conference or other specific time and
place, any designated documents and tangible things, not privileged, which constitute
or contain relevant evidence. The party seeking production should serve copies of the
application on the other party or parties to the proceeding, who should be given an
opportunity to notify the presiding officer of any objections. The presiding officer
should order the production of such designated documents and tangible things unless
he finds that there is not good cause for doing so.
(c) From the Agency
For the purposes of Recommendation 6, the agency conducting the proceeding
should be considered a party to the proceeding whether or not the agency staff
participates as a party to the proceeding.
7. Role of the Presiding Officer
(a) Control Over Discovery
The presiding officer should have the authority to impose schedules on the parties
to the proceeding specifying the periods of time during which the parties may pursue
each means of discovery available to them under the rules of the agency. Such
schedules and time periods should be set with a view to accelerating disposition of the
case to the fullest extent consistent with fairness.
(b) Interlocutory Appeals
Except as provided by Recommendation 2(6) above, an interlocutory appeal from
a ruling of the presiding officer on discovery should be allowed only upon certification
by the presiding officer that the ruling involves an important question of law or policy
which should be resolved at that time by the appropriate review authority.
Notwithstanding the presiding officer's certification, the review authority should have
the authority to dismiss summarily the interlocutory appeal if it should appear that
the certification was improvident. An interlocutory appeal should not result in a stay
of the proceedings except in extraordinary circumstances.
8. Protective Orders
(a) Authority of Presiding Officer in General
The presiding officer should have the authority, upon motion by a party or by the
person from whom discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, to make any order
which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment,
oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the following: (1)
that the discovery not be had; (2) that the discovery may be had only on specified
terms and conditions, including a designation of the time or place; (3) that the
discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other than that selected by the
party seeking discovery; (4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope
of the discovery be limited to certain matters; (5) that discovery be conducted with no
one present except persons designated by the presiding officer; (6) that a deposition
after being sealed be opened only by order of the presiding officer; (7) that a trade
secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information not be
disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way; (8) that the parties simultaneously
file specified documents or information enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as
directed by the presiding officer.
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(b) Names of Witnesses
The presiding officer should have the authority, upon motion by a party or other
person, and for good cause shown, by order (a) to restrict or defer disclosure by a
party of the name of a witness, a narrative summary of the expected testimony of a
witness or, in the case of an agency witness, any prior statement of the witness, and
(b) to prescribe other appropriate measures to protect a witness. Any party affected
by such action should have an adequate opportunity, once he learns the name of a
witness and obtains the narrative summary of his expected testimony or, in the case of
an agency witness, his prior statement or statements, to prepare for cross-
examination and for the presentation of his case.
(c) In Camera Proceedings
The presiding officer should have the authority to permit a party or person seeking
a protective order to make all or part of the showing of good cause in camera. A
record should be made of such in camera proceedings. If the presiding officer enters a
protective order following a showing in camera, the record of such showing should be
sealed and preserved and made available to the agency or court in the event of an
appeal.
9. Subpoenas
The presiding officer should have the power to issue subpoenas ad testificandum
and duces tecum at any time during the course of the proceeding. Agencies affected by
these Recommendations that do not have the statutory authority to issue subpoenas
should seek to obtain any necessary authority from the Congress.
Earlier drafts of these recommendations prepared by the author contained an
additional recommendation dealing with discovery of exculpatory material. That
recommendation, which was not approved by the Committee on Compliance and
Enforcement Proceedings and therefore not submitted to the full conference, read as
follows:
/0. Exculpatory Material
Agency rules should provide that an attorney or employee appearing in the pro-
ceeding on behalf of the agency has a duty to disclose to the other parties to the
proceeding relevant material or information which supports the position of any other
party where the value of the material or information to that party is or should have
been apparent or where disclosure of the material or information is specifically re-
quested by a party. The duty of the attorney or employee under this recommendation
extends to material or information within his personal knowledge or possession or in
the possession or control of or known by any person who assisted the agency in the
investigation or preparation of the proceeding and who either regularly reports to or
with reference to the particular proceeding has reported to the attorney or employee.
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